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Abstract
AMERICAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE 1990S: CONTINUITIES AND 
CHANGES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
Andrew David Haimes
Turkish Studies M.A., 2014
Fuat Keyman
Keywords: Turkey, US, Bilateral, Relationship, Alliance
Throughout the Cold War, the bilateral ties between the US and Turkey, epitomized by 
their  cooperation  in  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty Organization  (NATO),  provided both 
states with the necessary means to secure their sovereignty, freedom, and development 
to the greatest degree possible. However, the end of the bipolar confrontation between 
the US and the Soviet  Union provided for the potential  split  or dramatic change in 
bilateral ties. This thesis focuses on both the continuities and changes that shaped US-
Turkey relations in the first decade of the post-Cold War era. First, despite the fall of the 
Soviet Union—the initial  cause of their  connection via existential  fear—the US and 
Turkey sought to maintain tactical ties. Furthermore, American goals and desires still 
often heavily affected Turkey's external and internal policies. Second, the sometimes 
turbulent  and  distrustful  history  between  these  two  states  often  colored  Turkish 
responses to American policies both towards Turkey and to the region, frequently in an 
apprehensive manner. A liberal realist theoretical framework was used in the inquiry.
To investigate these hypotheses, I utilized a review of the relevant, existing literature, 
which  were  supplemented  by  primary  research  including  personal  interviews  with 
former Turkish and American government officials. The results substantiated the first 
hypothesis,  but  did  not  provide  enough  evidence  to  either  convincingly confirm or 
refute the second hypothesis. The results of this investigation not only adds depth to the 
existing  understanding  of  the  US-Turkish  bilateral  relationship,  but  also  provide  a 
theoretical framework to examine other alliances in the post-Cold War era.
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Özet
1990'larda AMERİKAN-TÜRK İLİŞKİLERİ: SOĞUK SAVAŞ-SONRASI DÖNEMDE 
SÜREKLİLİKLER VE DEĞİŞİMLER
Andrew David Haimes
Türkiye Çalişmalari M.A., 2014
Fuat Keyman
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Birleşik Devletler, İlişkiler, İttifak 
Soğuk Savaş sürecince, Birleşik Devletler ve Türkiye arasındaki ikili ilişkiler, Kuzey 
Atlantik  Antlaşması  Örgütü  (NATO)’ndeki  işbirliklerinden  de  örneklendirilebileceği 
üzere, her iki devlete de egemenliklerini, özgürlüklerini, ve kalkınmalarını olabilecek en 
iyi derecede koruma yolları sağlamıştır. Fakat, Birleşik Devletler ile Sovyetler Birliği 
arasındaki çift kutuplu çatışmanın son bulması iki ülke arasındaki ikili ilişkilerde olası 
kopmalara  veya  belirgin  değişimlere  zemin  hazırlamıştır.  Bu  tez  Soğuk  Savaş’tan 
sonraki ilk on yılda Birleşik Devletler-Türkiye ilişkilerini şekillendiren devamlılıklara 
ve değişimlere odaklanmaktadır.  İlk olarak,  Sovyetler Birliği’nin  —iki ülke arasında 
varoluşsal  kaygılarla  oluşan  bağın  birincil  sebebinin—  çöküşüne  rağmen  Birleşik 
Devletler  ve  Türkiye  taktiksel  ilişkilerini  korumanın  yollarını  aramışlardır.  Buna  ek 
olarak,  Birleşik  Devletler’in  hedefleri  ve  istekleri  halen  Türkiye’nin  dış  ve  iç 
politikalarını yoğun olarak etkilemeye devam etmiştir. İkinci olarak, iki ülke arasında 
geçmişte  yaşanmış  bazı  çalkantılı  ve  güvensizlik  teşkil  eden  olaylar,  Türkiye’nin 
Birleşik  Devletler’in  Türkiye’ye  ve  bölgeye  dönük  politikalarına  verdiği  tepkileri 
çoğunlukla  etkilemiş,  ve  bu  tepkiler  genellikle  endişeli  bir  tutum  sergilemiştir. 
Araştırma sırasında liberal gerçekçi bir teoretik çerçeve kullanılmıştır.
Bu hipotezleri araştırmak için, konu ile ilgili var olan literatür incelemesinin yanı sıra, 
önceden görev yapmış Türk ve Amerikan yetkililerle yapılan yüz yüze görüşmeleri de 
içeren  birincil  araştırmalardan  da  faydalanılmıştır. Sonuçlar  ilk  hipotezi  doğrulamış, 
fakat ikinci hipotezi doğrulayacak ya da yanlışlayacak yeterli kanıtı sağlamamıştır. Bu 
araştırmanın sonuçları Birleşik Devletler-Türkiye arasındaki ikili ilişkilere yeni boyutlar 
v
katmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda Soğuk Savaş sonrası diğer ittifakları incelemek için 
de teoretik bir çerçeve.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Starting with the Second World War, the relationship between the United States 
and Turkey has been rooted firmly within the wider geopolitical and historical context. 
The bipolar confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold 
War defined this environment and formed the basis of and impetus for their strategic 
alliance. The bilateral ties between the US and Turkey, epitomized by their cooperation 
in  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO),  provided  both  states  with  the 
necessary means to secure their sovereignty, freedom, and development to the greatest 
degree  possible.  However,  this  relationship  was  not  predetermined;  its  fruition, 
maturation, and maintenance required the perennial efforts of diplomats, governments, 
and military leaders on both sides. These efforts proved particularly important in the 
subsequent historical period during and following the crumbling of the Soviet Union 
and  Eastern  Bloc  between  1989-1991.  Whereas  the  previous  bipolar  confrontation 
provided Turkey an explicit security-based reason to maintain close ties with the US, 
sometimes at great cost to the Turks, this new era presented Turkey with an opportunity 
to chart a fundamentally new path, if it so desired. 
To sustain  their  relationship,  both  the  US and Turkey thus  had to  find  new 
justifications for their continued close, strategic connection beyond simply institutional 
inertia and nostalgia. This thesis focuses on both changes and continuities in shaping 
US-Turkey relations in the first decade of the post-Cold War era. First, despite the fall 
of the Soviet Union—the initial cause of their connection via existential  fear—the US 
and Turkey sought to maintain tactical ties. Furthermore, American goals and desires 
still  often  heavily  affected  Turkey's  external  and  internal  policies.  Second,  the 
sometimes  turbulent  and  distrustful  history  between  these  two  states  often  heavily 
influenced  Turkish  responses  to  American  policies  both  towards  Turkey and  to  the 
region, frequently in an apprehensive manner. 
This argument is substantiated by employing a methodology involving both a 
review of the present literature and personal interviews conducted in person or by phone 
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with former American and Turkish governmental officials. The literature review focused 
on  books  and  journal  articles  written  on  US-Turkish  relations  or  Turkish  regional 
policies, as well as contemporaneous newspaper articles of specific events. A total of ten 
interviewees were consulted, seven American and three Turkish. The American officials 
and their positions during the period under study were National Security Adviser Brent 
Scowcroft,  Deputy  Chief  of  Mission  Jim  Holmes,  Ambassador  Marc  Grossman, 
Ambassador Mark R. Parris, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Marshall P. 
Adair, Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz, and Ambassador for aid to the post-Soviet 
States Richard Armitage. The Turkish officials were Foreign Minister and form Chief 
Adviser to the Presidency and Prime Ministry Emre Gönensay, United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) Commissioner-
General and former Foreign Minister İlter Türkmen, and permanent Undersecretary at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then Ambassador to the UK Özdem Sanberk. These 
officials were chosen because of their active involvement in official policy and bilateral 
negotiations  in  the  1990s.  Furthermore,  many  of  the  interviewees,  as  high  level, 
influential  and  redoubtable  officials  within  their  respective  governments,  also  had 
historical  experience  in  US-Turkish  relations.  While  conducting  the  interviews,  I 
utilized  a  standard  set  of  questions  reflecting  the  sectoral  framework of  this  thesis. 
However, interviewees had the freedom to take their responses in tangential directions 
as  they  saw fit.  The  interviews  with  these  former  officials  not  only reinforced  the 
existing  literature  available  on  this  time  period,  but  also  provided  new insight  and 
perspectives into the rationales behind American and Turkish policies and responses. 
This thesis is further divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two introduces the 
theoretical  framework  that  will  support  the  ensuing  discussion.  The  liberal  realist 
approach  that  is  utilized  provides  the  structure  necessary  to  better  understand  the 
reasoning behind the decisions of both parties in the relationship, both in the bipolar and 
unipolar periods. Chapter Three provides a brief history of the relationship during the 
Cold War to establish the context in which the alliance found itself in the 1990s. The 
five chapters that follow the historical discussion provide the crux of this investigation. 
Chapter Four investigates Turkey's relationship with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and 
the Iraqi Kurds in the North throughout the 1990s. It is further divided between the 
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initial multilateral war in 1990-91 against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing no-
fly zone that was established over Iraqi territory. The shifts in relations between the US 
and Turkey elaborated within this  section prove to be some of the most heated and 
important  in  the  relationship's  history.  Chapter  Five  examines  Turkey's  expanded 
foreign policy towards the post-Soviet States in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well 
as the Balkans. The fall of the Eastern Bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
provided Turkey with a  newfound opportunity to interact  with many states  in  these 
regions and promote both its own interests and those of its allies. There is a particular 
focus on the oil pipeline connecting Turkey to Azerbaijan via Georgia and the NATO 
intervention in Bosnia. Chapter Six analyzes Turkey's changing policies toward Israel, 
Iran,  and Syria.  Although these  three  states  were  certainly not  always  the  focus  of 
Turkish  foreign  policy,  their  confluence  with  American  interests  proved particularly 
important in how Turkey's policies evolved over the decade. 
Chapter  Seven  explores  the  relationship  between  the  European  Union  and 
Turkey, and the role that the United States played in forging closer ties between the two 
actors. Special attention is paid to the EU accession process and its effect on Turkish 
domestic  policies.  Chapter  Eight  delves  further  into  Turkey's  national  politics.  It 
examines  the  internal  adjustments  that  Turkey  made  throughout  the  decade  in  its 
attempts to stabilize and liberalize both politically and economically. The role that the 
US had in  supporting,  encouraging  or  discouraging  these  processes  is  of  particular 
importance. Finally, Chapter Nine provides a summary of the thesis’ results and their 
relation to the initial hypothesis. Furthermore, it furnishes a brief analysis on how these 
results affect US-Turkish relations to the present day and the role that they may have 
played in the events and crises that occurred after the period under investigation.  
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2.  A LIBERAL REALIST APPROACH TO THE ALLIANCE
The 1990s provide a unique opportunity to investigate the interactions between 
different states. Unlike the previous half century,  with the end of the Cold War this 
decade was defined by the ascendance of the United States as the preeminent global 
power  with  no  near-term  competitors.  Thus,  the  theoretical  frameworks  that 
underpinned the study of international relations had to change and adapt in accordance 
with the new reality defined by the end of the bipolar confrontation between the US and 
the Soviet Union.1 To better understand the motivations and limitations of the US and 
the players with which it interacted in the beginning of the post-Cold War era in the 90s, 
it is best initially to review some competing theoretical frameworks and then propose 
aspects  of  a  liberal  realist  interpretation  to  most  clearly  explain  recent  US-Turkish 
relations. However, prior to embarking upon the details of the theories, it is critical to 
define the terminology and vocabulary employed.
Perhaps the two most important and loaded words used here are 'bipolar' and 
'unipolar.' An international system that is bipolar contains two states that maintain the 
majority of military, economic, and cultural influences within their relative spheres of 
influence. The alliances that typified this period—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—were 
based on the ideological hegemon providing for the security of the member states and 
their existing regimes. Throughout the Cold War (roughly from the end of the Second 
World War in 1945 to the dissolution of the Soviet  Union in 1991),  the world was 
divided more  or  less  between the  Western  and capitalist  states  that  were  under  the 
general influence of the US and the Communist states that were under the influence of 
1  Historically,  US-Turkish  relations  have  been  analyzed  using  traditional  realist  or 
neorealist models like those espoused by Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, or John 
Mearsheimer.  These  theoretical  frameworks  had  at  their  core  the  focus  on  the 
competitive self-interest of unitary states in an anarchic world. The neorealists further 
contributed  a  greater  understanding  of  the  balance  of  power  and  the  formation  of 
alliances in multipolar and bipolar international systems that largely precluded liberal or 
constructivist ideas that focused on the roles of international institutions, agency and 
actors within states, and the socially constructed nature of the nation-state. 
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the Soviet Union. This system mirrored that of a hub and its spokes; the hub facilitates 
coordination  among  the  states  that  are  arrayed  around  it.2 However,  the  goods  and 
services provided by the hub exceeded simply security. They also included financial and 
economic aid, as well as the underpinnings of a regional or global economic system. For 
instance,  the  US—as  the  hub  for  NATO—also  formed  the  basis  for  the  economic, 
financial, and aid systems of the Western world, epitomized by the IMF, Bretton Woods 
monetary system, and the World Bank.  
Additionally,  while there were self-professed non-aligned states such as India 
and Yugoslavia, their foreign and even national policies were often heavily influenced 
and  impacted  by  the  competing  poles,  despite  their  self-described  independence. 
Conversely, the end of the Cold War between 1989-91 ushered in the emergence of a 
unipolar moment wherein the international system “contain[ed] one state whose overall 
share of capabilities place[ed] it unambiguously in a class by itself compared to all other 
states.”3 Although the economic and military capabilities of the US most likely outshone 
those  of  the  USSR  throughout  most  of  the  Cold  War,  it  was  not  the  absolute 
predominance of power that determined the nature of the international system. Instead, 
it was the relative power relationship that deemed the previous era bipolar; the US and 
USSR far outweighed any possible challengers in their range of capacities. In turn, the 
1990s saw the US far exceed any potential competitor on both an absolute and relative 
scale—an  unparalleled  feat  in  modern  history—signifying  its  unipolar  moment. 
However, while the US had no near peer competitor for global predominance, the loss 
of an aggressor in the USSR potentially freed its allies from their reliance upon and 
therefore obligations to the US. Thus, the liberal realist framework expects the unipole 
to act cooperatively with others to forestall any defections from its alliance.4
Although the US found itself to be a leader in a unipolar moment, it had not 
reached the paramount status as a global hegemon. A true hegemon would be able to 
police all regions of the world and institutionalize the system as it saw fit, with little 
regard to the concerns of other states. In the 1990s, the US fell “well short of global 
hegemony,  which [meant]  that  major  powers  must  continue to worry about  security 
2 Ikenberry 2011, 224.
3 Ikenberry et al 2011, 6.
4 Ikenberry and Kupchan 2004, 40.
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issues  and  take  steps  to  guarantee  it,  either  alone  or  in  concert  with  others.”5 
Nevertheless, the US, still the unipole at the time, had a greater capacity to interact with 
other states and shape responses to regional and global issues than it had during the 
previous  period.  Thus,  it  is  important to  analyze in what ways the US chose to  act 
within  the  world  system;  a  spectrum  from  revisionist  to  conservative  provides  an 
effective way to judge such actions. 
In this context, a revisionist power would seek to promote its own interests—
however  conceived—at  the  expense  of  not  only  other  states,  but  the  existing 
international  system  as  well.  In  the  American  unipolar  example,  this  would  be  a 
particularly important instance of rule-breaking by a near-hegemon, considering that the 
international  system  was  “already  strongly  shaped  by  its  power  and  preferences.”6 
Conversely, a conservative unipolar power would seek to not only abide by, but in fact 
buttress  and  expand  the  existing  international  system.  Robert  Jervis  and  G.  John 
Ikenberry best demonstrated the contra-distinct views. Jervis argued that the unipolar 
moment provided “powerful structural incentives for the leading state to be revisionist.” 
These included the lack of a countervailing power, the tendency for the interests and 
fears  of  the state  to  increase  as  its  relative capabilities  increase,  and the increasing 
likelihood  of  worrying  about  the  future  because  of  the  desirability  of  the  present 
situation. Additionally, Jervis argues that the unipole's greater relative capabilities made 
it more likely to take on global policing responsibilities (public good) as well as the 
desire to influence the end-game result in the best possible way, according to its own 
interpretations. A unipole in this instance may best be described as a “system maker and 
privilege taker,”7 as it constructs the system and utilizes its status to take advantage of it. 
Furthermore, Jervis suggests that “because the unipole has wide discretion in the nature 
and extent of the goods provided, its efforts are likely to be perceived by less powerful 
states as hypocritical attempts to mask the actual pursuit of private goods.”8 
In contrast, Ikenberry, in describing a distinctly American unipole, argues that in 
the “liberal order built around US power...the unipole faces strong general incentives to 
5 Walt 2011, 100.
6 Ikenberry et al 2011, 14.
7 Ibid., 16.
8 Ibid., 16.
6
maintain this order. Even if it acts as a privilege taker on specific issues, its overall  
support  for  the  institutional-normative  order  has  many  attributes  of  public  goods 
provision.”9 Although  both  explanations  have  merit,  the  Ikenberry  approach  better 
describes  the  American-built  liberal  order  in  the  1990s,  while  Jervis’s  analytical 
approach proves somewhat more useful in understanding the changing uses of American 
power  during  and  after  the  Iraq  War  of  2003.  Ikenberry  elaborated  further  on  this 
conservative  perspective  with  Charles  A.  Kupchan  in  their  explanation  of  liberal 
realism.  Accordingly,  the  US,  as  the  momentary  unipole,  benefited  from  the 
strengthening and spread of international bodies that constrained the exercise of military 
power  for  all  actors  except  through  the  institutions  that  were  largely  modeled  on 
American ideals of a rules-based international system. Furthermore, these institutions 
would provide the US with potential to use military force abroad legitimately in the eyes 
of both allies and adversaries.
Beyond  the  perspective  of  the  unipole,  it  is  important  to  understand  the 
motivations and reasoning behind the other potential actors in this international system. 
From the position of American Cold War allies, the loss of a unifying central threat (the 
USSR), “[signified] that the US [had] less control over adjustment struggles with its 
principal  economic  partners,  because  it  [could]  no  longer  leverage  their  security 
dependence  to  dictate  international  economic  outcomes.”10 The  rapid  growth  of 
globalization  in  the  1990s  reinforced  this  tendency.  Additionally,  America's 
institutionalization of the necessity to acquire legitimacy to wage war also constrained 
US actions  to a  certain degree (although the 2003 Iraq War certainly proved that  a 
committed unipolar power could still overcome such institutionalization if sufficiently 
committed). Furthermore, the end of a bipolar world allowed for smaller states to shift 
from hard balancing (formal military alliances such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact) to 
soft balancing (hiding, binding, delegitimization, or norm entrapment). 
These subtler balancing strategies could be used against the unipole as well as 
regional hegemons that instigated conflicts—both in concert with and independent of 
the unipole.11 However, soft-balancing can be difficult to identify fully,  since actions 
9 Ibid., 16-17.
10 Ibid., 17-18.
11 Ibid., 21.
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taken may or may not be motivated by balancing away from the unipole. For example, a 
military build up could develop in support of an existing unipolar alliance or an attempt 
to break away. Conversely, states could simply be seeking additional assets—whether 
individually or collectively—to “gain a measure of autonomy and hedge against future 
uncertainties”12 in  the  long-term.  Alternatively,  the  unipole  might  experience 
bandwagoning, wherein more and more states join the unipole for their own security 
concerns to balance against another entity, not the unipole.13 For example, “medium and 
lesser powers [might] align with the United States not because they fear US power but 
because they are primarily concerned with regional threats and want to use US power to 
deal with them.”14 It will be argued later that the case of the First Gulf War reflects this 
latter perspective. 
Stephen M. Walt outlined four key factors that would help explain the power 
struggles  within  security  alliances  such  as  NATO  in  both  bipolar  and  unipolar 
international  systems.  First,  the  strongest  player  in  the  alliance  tends  “to  bear  a 
disproportionate share of the costs while smaller members tend to free ride.”15 Second, 
“the  more  asymmetric  the  distribution  of  capabilities  within  an  alliance,  the  more 
durable it  is  likely to be and the greater  the ability of the alliance leader to  dictate 
alliance  policy.”16 Third,  the  small  and  medium-sized  states  within  an  alliance  fear 
abandonment,  being  left  in  the  lurch  in  a  crisis,  or  entrapment,  being  dragged into 
misguided wars by one's alliance commitments, at the hands of the alliance's hegemon.17 
Within a unipolar international system, the unipole becomes less worried about smaller 
allies leaving the alliance, since there is no other pole to which to defect.18 Additionally, 
the lack of a possible defection point means that the unipole can apply great pressure on 
smaller states to join any coalitions of the willing it sees fit to promote.19 A later chapter 
will  discuss  how Turkey experienced both  of  these  sentiments  throughout  this  time 
12 Walt 2011, 123.
13 Ibid., 128.
14 Ibid., 101.
15 Ibid., 103.
16 Ibid., 103.
17 Ibid., 104.
18 Ibid., 113.
19 Ibid., 114.
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period. Lastly, an alliance is strengthened and attains improved longevity if it is highly 
institutionalized, if it is based on liberal regimes of governance, and if explicit norms 
regulating the alliance decision making process exist.20 This is particularly important in 
the  unipolar  system, whereby the  largely structurally-determined alliance ties  of  the 
bipolar system have disappeared due to the loss of the central military confrontation that 
inspired the alliances in the first place.21 With the absent or greatly diminished structural 
imperatives, a unipole has “greater leeway to opt for its preferences,” whether they are 
fellow liberal regimes or other states that will follow its wars of choice. Furthermore, 
the liberal realist framework anticipates the potential for defections, since the loss of the 
bipolar confrontation lessens the existential fear that a smaller state may experience.22
Although this analysis has outlined only some of the many interpretations and 
frameworks that attempt to explain the international system in both bipolar and unipolar 
periods,  the  highlighted  factors  will  help  to  explain  the  interactions  and  evolving 
relationship  between  the  United  States  and  Turkey from the  Cold  War  through  the 
1990s. To summarize in the words of Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, a liberal realist 
interpretation of the international system thus focuses on three points. First, the pole—in 
this case the US—must “wield its superior strength in concert with others to ensure that 
it forestalls rather than invites balancing behavior.”23 Second, the pole cooperates with 
and  encourages  the  “secular  diffusion  of  global  power,”24 that  is  to  say,  the 
accommodation of other powers into a rule-based order that contributes to international 
stability. Third, the pole's strength relies upon more than its military strength; it must 
have a  “moral  authority abroad”25 that  encourages allies  and adversaries to  feel  like 
“stakeholders in the international system.”26 This synthesis of realist rational self-interest 
and  liberal  institutionalism best  reflects  and explains  mechanism by which  that  the 
bilateral relationship evolved between the US and Turkey, within the broader NATO 
alliance and the international system. The following chapter will apply this theoretical 
20 Ibid., 104.
21 Ibid., 109.
22 Ikenberry and Kupchan 2004, 40.
23 Ibid., 40.
24 Ibid., 40.
25 Ibid., 41.
26 Ibid., 41.
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framework to the historical dynamic between the US and Turkey during the Cold War 
era.
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3.  HISTORY – A STRONG ALLIANCE WITH DEEP SHADOWS
Historically,  the relationship between the United States  and Turkey—and the 
Ottoman Empire before it—lacked depth and breadth. It took the Ottoman Empire and 
the US until 1867 and 1901, respectively, to establish diplomatic legations because their 
relationship lacked “geographic, cultural, or economic foundations.”27 Although Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk founded the Turkish Republic in 1923 with a desire to modernize and 
develop both  the  state  and society along  European and  Western  paradigms,  contact 
between the US and Turkey remained minimal for roughly two decades.28 It was only in 
the waning months of the Second World War that this formerly negligible connection 
began to grow in importance. At this time, the budding global rivalry between the USSR 
and  the  US had just  commenced  in  earnest  and most  independent  states,  including 
Turkey,  began  seeking  out  positions  within  the  alliances  formed  by  the  growing 
superpowers.  To  begin  with,  Turkey  feared  Soviet  desires  to  amend  the  Montreux 
Convention for its own benefit and to gain control over parts of eastern Anatolia lost by 
Tsarist Russia as it exited the First World War.29 The Turks, due to the growing bipolarity 
in the international system and its existing Western orientation, thus sought out as close 
an alliance as possible within the US sphere of influence. Contrary to these Turkish 
concerns, the Americans, as early as September 1945, saw the Soviet's potential use of 
the Bosporus Straits to turn Turkey into a “vassal”30 state. This fear was best described 
by US Ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson in a March 23, 1946 cable wherein he 
argued  that  the  USSR was  using  the  “Straits  question  in  order  to  destroy  Turkish 
independence, establish a 'friendly' regime in Turkey thereby closing one remaining gap 
in [a] chain [of] Soviet satellite states from [the] Baltic to [the] Black Sea.”31 He argued 
that “Turkish independence [had] become a vital interest for the US.”32
27 Aliriza and Aras 2012, 1. 
28 Brzezinski 2012, 128. 
29 Ibid., 1.
30 Diplomatic Cable, 1946.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. 
11
These fears thus initiated a seven-year process in which the growing concerns 
over Soviet expansion or attack overshadowed continued unease regarding including 
Turkey  within  an  alliance  for  collective  security.  The  next  big  milestone  in  the 
relationship was the receipt of two British aide-memoires describing Britain's inability 
to continue to support Turkey and Greece militarily and economically.  This led to a 
frank discussion between the Executive and Legislative branches of the United States on 
the importance of aid to these two states, which was eventually codified in the Truman 
Doctrine  on  March  12,  1947.33 A dramatic  increase  in  financial  and  military  aid 
followed; however, the Turks still expressed significant fear of Soviet attack and the 
lack of Turkish inclusion in NATO, the Western collective security alliance.  Turkish 
Interim Foreign  Minister  Tahsin  Bekir  Balta  thus  submitted  in  December  15,  1948 
Turkey's first of three applications for admission to NATO.34 Although the US stressed 
throughout the rest of the 1940s Turkey's strategic importance, the Turks were unable to 
achieve what they coveted most at that time—a treaty-backed guarantee by the US to 
protect Turkey. 
Yet the aforementioned intimate connection was only achieved after Turkey’s 
contribution  to  the  allied  effort  in  the  Korean  War.  Although  numerically  small, 
Turkey’s  role  in  the  war  revealed  the “tremendous  fighting qualities  of  the  Turkish 
troops” and “demonstrated its willingness to participate in collective security.”35 It was 
primarily  due  to  this  military  involvement  and  the  successful  Turkish  democratic 
elections  of  1950 that  the  US was  able  to  encourage  Turkey’s  inclusion  in  NATO, 
despite  the  concern  by  some  NATO  allies  that  Turkey—alongside  Greece—might 
diminish  the  democratic  and  western  character  of  the  alliance.36 Ambassador 
Abramowitz possibly summarized the Turkish efforts best, describing them as 
   “[this] was why Turkey entered the Korean War, and that was why [they] 
recognized Israel. They were not worried about aggression in Korea or had 
great affection for Israel, it was their way of making sure that the Americans 
would push [for] them, get them into NATO.”37
33 Diplomatic Cable, 1947.
34 Memorandum, 1948.
35 Memorandum, 1951.
36 Diplomatic Cable, 1951.
37 Abramowitz 2013.
12
However,  while  the  US valued  the  democratic  and  western  character  of  the 
alliance for strategic and public relations reasons, American policymakers were actually 
more concerned with ensuring Turkey's entrance into the Western coalition in the face of 
a potentially aggressive Soviet Union. An April 9, 1951 memorandum by the US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff best illustrated this turning point in the American perspective on Turkish 
entrance to NATO:
   “United  States  security  interests  demand  that  Turkey and  Greece  be 
admitted as full members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  attach  such  great  importance  to  insuring  that 
Turkey and Greece are on the side of the Western Powers at the outset of a 
general war that they are willing to agree to an alternative mutual security 
arrangement for Turkey and Greece if their inclusion in NATO would be 
delayed to such an extent that orientation with the West in the event of a 
general  war  would  be  jeopardized.  The  Joint  chiefs  of  Staff,  from the 
military  point  of  view,  would  not  regard  either  bilateral  security 
arrangements  between  the  United  States  and  Turkey  or  Greece  as  an 
adequate solution.”38
Following this convincing memorandum from the pinnacle of the military, the rest of 
the US government toed a similar  line and pressed for Turkey's  quick admission to 
NATO in February 1952.
The Turkish admission to NATO touched off roughly a decade of strong bilateral 
ties between Turkey and the United States, including the deployment of US Jupiter II 
nuclear missiles in Turkey in 1959.39 The military deployment was seen as a further 
guarantor of American support for Turkish security in case of Soviet attack in response 
to  the  inclusion  of  additional  American  soldiers  on  Turkish  soil.  But,  this  rosy 
relationship would begin to face a series of tribulations beginning with the 1960 Turkish 
military coup. Despite the importance of a democracy to the NATO charter, the US 
continued to support Turkey throughout its coup government because of the persistent 
fear  of  Turkey  turning  to  the  Soviets  for  economic  assistance.  Thus,  American 
Ambassador Warren, in a report on the coup to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern  Affairs,  remarked  that  the  US  should  continue  to  support  the  military 
government of Cemal Gürsel,  as it  did the civilian government  of Adnan Menderes 
38 Statement of Policy, undated.
39 Türkmen 2013.
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before  it,  and  any future  government—“if  it  is  not  commie”40—to  ensure  Turkey’s 
commitment to the West. This continued support, despite the breakdown of democracy, 
was the first of four instances wherein America's ideals ran aground against its security 
concerns to the assurance of Turkish democracy. According to US National Security 
Adviser Scowcroft, the continued American support for Turkey in spite of this and the 
following  three  military  coups  “probably,  overall,  made  a  closer  relationship  with 
Turkey more difficult,”41 because of the conflict between our ideals and our national 
security  interests.  For  instance,  Gönensay remarked that  even  though the  American 
government, military and intelligence circles did not know about the 1980 coup even 
during  the  preceding  evening,  conspiracy  theories  about  America's  involvement 
amongst the Turkish public remained widespread.42
The next major issues to test the bilateral alliance in the 1960s were the Cuban 
Missile  Crisis  and the Johnson Letter.  In part,  the Missile  Crisis  stemmed from the 
American-made,  but  increasingly  Turkish-operated,  Jupiter  II  missiles  stationed  in 
Turkey.  Although  the  missiles  were  largely  obsolete  by the  time  of  their  complete 
deployment  in  1960,  the  Turkish  government  saw  them as  a  political  and  military 
statement  of  independent  strength  as  well  as  security  within  the  NATO  alliance.43 
However, the US sought their removal and replacement with the more advanced Polaris 
submarine-based nuclear  missile  deterrent  system.  President  John F.  Kennedy made 
repeated overtures to the Turks for their replacement, in addition to requesting American 
studies to analyze the Jupiters' removal. The last such study commissioned before the 
crisis was in the NSC Action Memorandum of August 23, 1962.44 While the Americans 
believed that they would be supplying the Turks with a more effective deterrent in the 
Polaris system, the Turks felt that the removal of the Jupiters would signify a loss of 
America's  full  security  guarantee.  This  dynamic  set  the  foundation  for  the  Cuban 
Missile Crisis wherein President Kennedy agreed to secretly remove the Jupiters from 
Turkey if the Soviet Union publicly removed their nuclear missiles from Cuba. The idea 
40 Letter from Ambassador Warren, 1960.
41 Scowcroft 2013.
42 Gönensay 2014. 
43 Memorandum, 1962.
44 Uslu 2003, 138.
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to  keep  this  quid  pro  quo hidden  possibly  originated  on  the  American  side  from 
Ambassador Raymond Hare who suggested a covert  US-Soviet arrangement without 
Turkish  knowledge  to  minimize  damage  to  the  US-Turkish  relationship.45 Without 
knowing of their relationship to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Turks eventually were 
forced to accept the replacement of the Jupiters with the Polaris system on February 2,  
1963. 
Although the deal was not public knowledge, the American-mandated removal 
of  the  Jupiters  still  resulted  in  ill-feelings  within  the  Turkish  leadership.  President 
Lyndon B. Johnson would soon further exacerbate this negative sentiment with his June 
5, 1964 letter to President İsmet İnönü. The Johnson Letter implied that the US and its 
NATO allies might not be under legal obligation to protect Turkey if it were to suffer a 
Soviet intervention after Turkey became militarily involved in the Cyprus conflict. The 
threat of the practical rescission of the NATO collective security alliance for Turkey 
marked the “starting point of the losing of faith”46 in US-Turkish relations, according to 
Ambassador Özdem Sanberk. This incident painted a different conception in the minds 
of the Turkish public and officials than had existed beforehand. According the Sanberk,
   “Strategic relations...means [the] two parties must adjust their policies to 
each other, even if their basic interests do not correspond to what they are 
doing between them. This has never been the case between Turkey and the 
United States. The best and most concrete example is the Johnson Letter. 
Turkey, of course, with its NATO membership and relations with the US 
had always enjoyed the security of these relations. But when the insecurity 
or threat came from the south—[Cyprus]—this security arrangement was 
not valid.”47
Whereas the Turks felt that they were on a more even playing field prior to the Johnson 
Letter—even in spite of the forced removal of the Jupiter II Missiles—the aftermath of 
the letter proved to members of both the Turkish civilian and military elite and to the 
public  at  large  that  its  security  was  at  the  whim of  American  politics  and  not  as 
guaranteed as it had believed. 
Foreign Minister Türkmen expanded upon the aftermath of the Johnson letter, 
maintaining that despite a particularly warm reception at the White House when Turkish 
45 Ibid., 144.
46 Sanberk 2013.
47 Ibid.
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President İnönü visited later that year in 1964, the damage had been done at the societal 
level.  “Anti-Americanism...expanded from the ‘64 episode,  and since then has  been 
present  in  the  collective  memory”48 of  the  Turkish  people.  These  anti-American 
sentiments and issues of distrust  were exacerbated later that decade when the secret 
agreement  removing  the  Jupiters  was  publicized.  Türkmen  described  the  Turkish 
societal  response  as,  “America  betrayed  us,  they  made  a  deal  behind  us  without 
informing us. Anyway it is not forgotten. It is not forgotten.”49 Although these episodes 
strained their ties, the US and Turkey maintained a security-based relationship in which 
the Turks were very helpful to American interests, according to Scowcroft. Although it 
certainly “jarred the Turks...it did not prevent the continuation of a close intelligence 
relationship with Turkey.”50
Türkmen  shed  additional  light  on  the  differing  views  that  may  have  arisen 
between the political  elite  and the  population at  large.  According to  Türkmen,  in  a 
meeting with İnönü in 1973—nine years after the Johnson letter— İnönü said that he 
was “proud of one thing, that [he] did not send the Turkish army to Cyprus.”51 Türkmen 
expanded that the public usually could not see the entirety of the relationship and thus 
did not know “What went behind the Johnson letter...that İnönü in a sense invited this 
letter because he never wanted to intervene in Cyprus.”52 Whether this was hindsight or 
the true conviction of the former president is uncertain; however, this incident clearly 
demonstrated the capacity of Turkish anti-Americanism and the potential for the Turkish 
state to use America as an external actor and scapegoat to enact unpopular policies. 
Overall, these two episodes served to establish a base level of distrust in the relationship 
that would persist throughout the time period under investigation. 
The mistrust was further reinforced in the mid-1970s beginning with the 1974 
Congressional Arms Embargo of Turkey in reaction to the Turkish military invasion of 
Northern  Cyprus,  an  effort  to  protect  the  ethnic  Turkish  minority  located  there. 
Following this military action, the US Congress faced significant pressure, particularly 
48 Türkmen 2013.
49 Türkmen 2013.
50 Scowcroft 2013.
51 Türkmen 2013. 
52 Ibid. 
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from the Greek lobby (one of numerous influential ethnic lobbies), to sanction Turkey 
by embargoing further financial and military aid. According to Jim Holmes, who was 
Deputy Chief of Mission between 1992-1995, “it was politically motivated, [stemming 
from a] shallow understanding of what was going on in Cyprus that led to the Arms 
Embargo, and not a sufficient recognition of what the Turkish population of Cyprus had 
been  going  through  for  years  before  the  invasion  of  Cyprus.”53 Furthermore,  US 
officials,  such as  former National  Security Adviser  Henry Kissinger  argued that  the 
strategic  importance  of  Turkey  superseded  any  other  concerns  at  the  moment.  He 
described to President Gerald Ford how essential “the relationship with Turkey was to 
Western security, and that this relationship existed not as a favor to Turkey,”54 but as a 
consequence of the importance of Turkey to the security of not only the “Mediterranean, 
but of all of Europe and the Atlantic area.”55 President Ford signed the embargo bill 
despite concerns for national security and the effect such an embargo would have on 
America's image in Turkey. 
From the Turkish perspective, though, two parallel yet contrasting responses to 
the embargo emerged. In the first,  the general public  reacted very negatively to  the 
American  action,  dredging  up  stories  and  suspicions  from  the  previous  decade  to 
explain how deceitful and untrustworthy the Americans were. Conversely, there were 
members  of  the  elite  who  felt  that  the  embargo  was  a  welcome  shock  to  Turkish 
complacency  with  the  bilateral  alliance  and  their  reliance  upon  the  Americans. 
According to Türkmen, President Kenan Evren during the 1980s, while looking back on 
the episode, reflected how, 
   “you know, we were furious with the Americans, because they embargoed 
the aid to us. But, it was in fact a service to Turkey, because we had become 
so dependent on the US, not only for the weapons and ammunition and 
modern equipment, but everything, even the shoes of the soldiers.”56
This  duality of  response  mirrored  the contradictory reactions  highlighted  during the 
Johnson Letter crisis. Although the Turkish elite would certainly be offended in public
—and maybe even in private—by American actions, they also used such actions and 
53 Holmes 2013.
54 Aliriza and Aras 2012, page 4. 
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their  'dues  ex machina'  nature  to  enact  policies  that  might  have  proven difficult  or 
unpopular, such as not invading Cyprus in the 1960s after the Johnson Letter.
The continued tension within the bilateral alliance also had numerous underlying 
contributory factors, in addition to the aforementioned crises. Two of the major issues 
highlighted by Türkmen were the large number of foreign,  NATO bases on Turkish 
territory—a seeming insult to Turkish sovereignty—and that the Americans “exhibited a 
lifestyle much superior to that of the normal Turk.”57 In fact, the US government went so 
far as to distribute notices and directives to American officers instructing them how to 
interact with Turkish officials to avoid an antagonistic relationship. Nevertheless, these 
feelings,  coupled  with  the  media  “constantly  rehearsing”58 instances  of  perceived 
American  disloyalty  or  duplicity,  buttressed  anti-American  sentiment  well  into  the 
1990s  and  2000s.  Numerous  officials,  such  as  Holmes  and  Ambassador  Grossman, 
observed that Turkish officials would often bring up the Johnson Letter, Arms Embargo, 
or Cuban Missile Crisis.59 The continued American support for Turkey during the 1980 
military coup, wherein there were many human rights violations, would add among the 
Turkish  public  another  layer  of  distrust  and  anxiety  regarding  America.  It  was  a 
persistent refrain in the alliance when relations were at difficult points or when regional 
conflict loomed. 
In terms of the theoretical framework established above, the bipolar international 
system of the Cold War provided the US with a distinct advantage vis-a-vis Turkey in 
their bilateral relationship. The United States, being the security and economic hub of 
the Western alliance, had the asymmetric capacity to set security policy to a great degree 
for  the  NATO  alliance  at  large  and  Turkey  specifically.  Due  to  Turkey's  fears  of 
abandonment—left in the lurch in case of Soviet outright or clandestine attack—Turkish 
officials had to temper their own policy objectives and those of the Turkish public at 
large to accommodate those of the US.60 Beyond its security guarantee,  Turkey thus 
attained significant other goods at a disproportionate cost to the American public—best 
epitomized at its start in the Truman Doctrine.
57 Ibid.
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As the Cold War came to a close in the late 1980s and first two years of the  
1990s,  the  sometimes  rocky,  but  always  crucial,  relationship  between  the  US  and 
Turkey began to shift to a new trajectory. Despite how much the global and regional 
situation had changed—alongside the international system's shift to a unipolar moment
—it would be narrow-minded and unwise to analyze this time period as a distinct era. 
The anxieties, distrust and crises of the Cold War, in conjunction with its moments of 
true cooperation and feelings of brotherhood, played an important role in determining 
how actors on both sides of the Atlantic responded to new crises and events. In fact, 
America, with its increased scope to act in a newly unipolar world, spent a considerable 
amount of time tamping down the suspicions and concerns of Turkish officials while 
trying to confront many of the challenges that lay ahead in the new decade. 
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4.  IRAQ AND THE TESTING OF US-TURKISH TIES
4.1.  The Iraq War
Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 
set off a tense period not only in regional politics, but also between the United States 
and Turkey. The war would officially last until February 28, 1991. The invasion and the 
US-led efforts to push Saddam out of Kuwait that followed were a major shock and 
testing point for the US-Turkish relationship. The ways that the various actors within 
these two states interacted reflected not only the critical situation at hand, but also the 
rich, and at times tense, history that they shared. To help understand how and why these 
interactions played out the way that they did, it is useful to take stock of the global 
situation at the time. The year 1990 was the midpoint in the roughly three year process 
of the end to the Cold War that arguably began with the Polish roundtable and finished 
with  the Soviet  Union's  vote  to  disintegrate.  As it  was  such a  moment of  flux,  the 
concerns and priorities of the actors within the US and Turkey were understandably 
shifting and unstable. 
According to Sanberk, the rapid swing from concerns regarding containing the 
Soviet  Union—“the  core  concept  that  animated  Turkish-American  relations”61—to 
containing Saddam's  Iraq maintained the relationship's  importance.  Türkmen agreed, 
stating that although there was some fear of America losing interest in Turkey as the 
Soviet  Union and Communism crumbled, the rapid commencement  of the Iraq War 
mitigated such Turkish concerns. On the American side, some officials proposed similar 
points of view. According to Abramowitz, the Turks shifted from being “a very strong 
ally and...bulwark of NATO's southern flank”62 against the Soviets, to helping the US 
confront a Middle East that had erupted in chaos. Ambassador Grossman went even 
further, explaining how in 1989 and 1990 he and Ambassador Abramowitz worked to 
reassure  the  Turks  that  America  would  not  lose  interest.  Grossman  detailed  how a 
61 Sanberk 2013.
62 Abramowitz 2013.
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number of Turkish officials came to them concerned that they “would not be important” 
anymore, that “no one would pay any attention to them,” and that “NATO would go 
away.”63
Whereas Sanberk argued that containment—and the shift from the USSR to Iraq
—helped to maintain the relationship and its importance in the eyes of both parties, 
Grossman disagreed. He felt that instead, other matters helped to “galvanize US-Turkish 
relations after the fall of the wall, [including] the work that [they] were doing together 
in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and, also,”64 what was happening in Turkey internally at 
that  time  economically  and  politically.  Furthermore,  according  to  State  Department 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Adair, while “the importance of Turkey to the United States 
was still very high” it was secondary, “in terms of actual behavior, for many elements of 
the  US  government.”65 Ambassador  Parris  agreed.  While  the  Turks  may have  been 
preoccupied with where the end of the Cold War left the US-Turkish relationship, to the 
US, “Turkey was kind of an afterthought.”66
While  American  and  Turkish  officials  differed  on  the  importance  of  their 
relationship at this turning point, no one disagreed that the Iraq War proved pivotal in 
setting the stage for the next era of bilateral relations. Initially, the Turkish National 
Security Council  (NSC – which included both civilian and military leaders, but had 
been traditionally dominated by the military) believed that the Gulf War would quickly 
resolve itself, assuming that “it could preserve its traditional neutral attitude in what was 
seen  as  a  purely  inter-Arab  dispute,  without  damaging  its  links  with  the  Western 
powers.”67 However, this was not to be. The conflict quickly escalated and President 
Turgut  Özal  sought  to  firmly  reinforce  Turkey's  alliance  with  the  Western  powers, 
particularly the US. Özal quickly—and unilaterally within the Turkish government—cut 
off the crucial Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline (even before the United Nations Security 
Council resolution)68 and closed off all other commercial links, at tremendous economic 
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cost to Turkey (estimated at $2-2.5 billion a year).69 In doing so, Özal sought to prove 
that Turkey “could be trusted,”70 to gain leverage with the US on trade and defense 
issues, to develop its prospects for membership in the EU, and to increase its business 
opportunities  in  the  Arab  Gulf.71 This  embargo  was  also  a  “radical  departure  from 
Turkey’s established policy regarding non-involvement in regional conflicts and wars.”72 
Additionally, according to Sanberk,
   “Özal took this initiative, he was sure that he was going to be—that some 
pressure was going to be put on [by the Americans] and he was going to be 
obliged to do that. So he preempted this and not because he was afraid of 
these pressures, but he also thought that it  was in his interests,  Turkey’s 
interests, and also the region’s interests.”73
According to  Holmes,  “Özal  was the  most  dominant  player  since  İnönü and 
Atatürk”74 in  Turkish  politics  and  was  accordingly  able  to  determine  domestic  and 
international policies to a large degree while he was both in the Prime Ministry and the 
Presidency. Despite the fact that “the vast majority of Turks were absolutely opposed to 
supporting the US in this effort,”75 Özal cultivated a close and deep relationship with 
Former President George H.W. Bush and Former US Secretary of State James Baker 
that helped to transcend the public's opposition. National Security Adviser Scowcroft 
related that:
   “Bush and Özal's dialogue...produced an ‘intimate, personal’ bond ‘where 
the relationship really became...very close and in a sense less military and 
more  political  than  it  had  ever  been  before,’ while  ‘demonstrating  the 
indisputable strategic importance of Turkey to the United States.’”76
This close cooperation between Özal and Bush was also in spite of the opposition from 
the  Turkish  military,  which  had  traditionally  been  the  focal  point  of  US-Turkish 
relations (as seen in continued US support for Turkey during military coups). In fact, the 
Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Necip Torumtay, resigned over potential 
69 Hale 1992, 684.
70 Ibid., 687.
71 Sayari 1997, 46.
72 Ibid., 45.
73 Sanberk 2013.
74 Holmes 2013.
75 Grossman 2013.  
76 Aliriza and Aras 2012, 5.
22
Turkish involvement in the American-led effort on December 3, 1990. He “found Özal's 
‘unconventional’ way of dealing with the Gulf crisis unacceptable.”77 Although he was 
certainly concerned with Turkey’s potential military involvement in a regional conflict, 
Torumtay  also  was  concerned  with  opposition  from  lower  ranks.  This  resistance 
amongst the ranks is particularly distressing to military and civilian leaders considering 
lower and mid-ranked officers' involvement in instigating previous coups. According to 
Sanberk, 
   “The relationship between the Turkish Army and the American army at 
that time—the American armed forces—at the higher level was quite good. 
The difficulty was coming from the lower grades in Turkey; from majors, 
colonels, and perhaps brigadiers, etc. But when it comes to 4 star, 3 stars, 
their  difficulty  was  how  to  control  their  low-grade  staff.  And  there,  of 
course, there was lots of striking under the belly from the lower grades. 
Fighting with commanders.”78
Nevertheless, “Özal believed that he should support the US.”79 This assistance 
later  gained  greater  public  support  following  UN  resolutions  buttressing  the  US 
coalition.  According  to  Grossman,  the  UN  action  reduced  the  Turks'  wariness 
somewhat. Nonetheless, it “was a courageous decision for [Özal]”80 to overcome public 
opinion and assist the US wholeheartedly. This is certainly true in light of the continued 
resistance to the war effort from both opposition parties and Özal's own Motherland 
Party (ANAP). Possibly the greatest point of contention for the opposing politicians—as 
well as many members of the military—was the “fear [which] is always there, that the 
Americans are supporting the Kurds. [That] they want to create a big Kurdistan and 
weaken Turkey.”81 Bülent Ecevit—leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP)—called 
the  operation  “suicidal,”82 and  feared  that  it  would  create  a  de  facto,  independent 
Kurdish  state  in  Northern  Iraq  that  would  prove  disastrous  to  Turkey’s  territorial 
integrity. Erdal İnönü—leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party—disagreed with 
allowing Turkish troops to be under a foreign commander and declared that “Turkey 
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should liberate itself”83 from the deployment. Gönensay reflected that the military had a 
consistent and significant fear that Turkey was losing sovereignty and authority over its 
own territory in  allowing an  increased  American  presence.84 Furthermore,  Süleyman 
Demirel, the leader of the opposition True Path Party, disagreed with “turning Turkey 
into ‘an American aircraft carrier,’”85 referring to the American use of Turkish airbases 
to launch attacks. The opposition was so strong that the initial parliamentary vote to 
approve of the use of Turkey as a base of deployment for, and to add troops to, the allied 
effort failed. It was only after significant effort by Özal that he was able to win approval 
of Turkey's employment as a base of operations (albeit not a contributor of soldiers to 
Desert Storm). Adair particularly emphasized the importance of the Incirlik airbase in 
Southern Turkey to the allied war effort. 
However, before pushing internally for Turkish support of the American-led war, 
Özal had to be convinced of America's true intentions to see the crisis through, in order 
to gain his support beyond an economic embargo (which he introduced unilaterally). 
Grossman stated that, at this time, many Turkish officials would bring up the past crises
—particularly  the  Johnson  letter—to  question  America's  trustworthiness.  Grossman 
stated that, to Özal, the question for the US was, “are you going to do this like Grenada 
or are you going to go to war? Because if you are going to go to war, I am with you. But 
if you are going to fool around, we live here.”86 Özal apparently received a satisfactory 
answer when the bombings began during Desert Storm; he believed that the US was 
fully committed. In fact, he sought an even more comprehensive end to the Iraq War 
than the simple removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Özal, whose hatred of Saddam and 
concern with bordering an Iraq led by him was immense, actually wanted the US to go 
to Baghdad and overthrow his regime. 
This  tactical  approach—a  clear  instance  of  bandwagoning—helps  to  further 
explain Özal's decisions. According to Sanberk, “Özal made a very realistic analysis of 
the  situation  and [saw] Turkey’s  interest  in  [the]  elimination  of  Saddam Hussein.”87 
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Although “one of the basic principles of Turkish diplomacy was that unless there is 
aggression to Turkish territories, there is not any reason for Turkey to make war,” 88 Özal 
saw the opportunity to potentially rid the region of the unpredictable Saddam variable, 
or at least constrain his capacity to cause further trouble. In spite of the difficulties in 
convincing  the  Turkish  Grand  National  Assembly  (TGNA)  of  the  importance  of 
supporting the American action, he believed that this was an opportunity to potentially 
utilize  America's  far  greater  military  capabilities  to  attack  one  of  Turkey's  primary 
regional  enemies  at  the  time.  Sanberk  summarized  Özal's  plan  of  action  succinctly, 
stating:
   “Özal’s policy was very clear and very coldblooded, if I may say so. He 
understood that there was a convergence of interests between Turkey and 
the US, and he acted accordingly. And first and foremost, success was to 
convince  the  US,  together  with  the  French and the  British  and the  UN 
Security Council Permanent Members, to create the no-fly zone”89
The no-fly zone to which Sanberk referred will be covered more fully in the next 
sub-chapter; nevertheless, the necessity of its existence reflected the facts on the ground 
at the end of the war. The Kurdish uprisings that began on February 2, 1991—with the 
vocal support of the US—had ended terribly for the Kurdish population of Northern 
Iraq. Without actual American military support, the Kurds were crushed by Saddam. In 
the waning days of the war, millions of Kurds fled their homes, primarily seeking refuge 
in  Southeastern  Turkey  and  Northwestern  Iran.  This  major  refugee  crisis  terrified 
Turkish politicians and military officials of all stripes, who not only feared the economic 
and  humanitarian  toll,  but  also  the  potential  it  had  for  exacerbating  Turkey's  own 
internal  Kurdish  problem.   According  to  Türkmen,  the  Iraq  War  strengthened  the 
already-mentioned concerns among Turkish officials that the US sought to create an 
independent Kurdistan.90 These fears, which were forcefully and energetically voiced to 
US officials, would lead to over a decade of a US-led no-fly zone over northern Iraq to 
help ameliorate Turkish concerns. 
Beyond the humanitarian and security concerns of the Turkish government and 
military, there also existed significant economic fears stemming from the Iraq War. As 
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detailed  earlier,  the  closing  of  the  pipeline  and  border  trade  was  a  considerable 
economic  burden.  Özal  believed  that  by  helping  the  US,  Turkey  would  receive 
economic and financial benefits. “Despite marginal US and Arab financial assistance 
and  a  rise  in  textile  quotas,”91 Turkey  received  no  other  support  and  experienced 
significant  economic hardship during the Gulf War.  These financial  concerns  would 
expand and intensify throughout the next decade due to the embargo on Iraq as well as 
the no-fly zone, both of which will be covered further in the next section. 
Beyond how the various stages of the war affected US-Turkish relations, it is 
important to further explore how these interactions fit into the theoretical framework 
outlined in Chapter Two. To begin, the shift from a bipolar to unipolar international 
system provided the US with the capacity to act in either a revisionist or conservative 
manner.  As seen throughout  the Iraq War,  the US chose to  maintain a  conservative 
approach. It supported existing states—instead of trying to carve up new nation-states as 
it saw fit. The US also utilized and strengthened the UN as a deliberative body that  
could legitimize wars to maintain or impose peace. Arguably the reason for the United 
States'  decision to  strengthen existing institutions  instead  of  overruling them is  that 
these institutions reflected American-influenced liberal ideals to a large degree. Thus by 
taking a conservative approach, the US not only strengthened its values in the view of 
the world,  but it  also effectively utilized the existing world system to beat  back an 
aggressive tyrant. As the US was not a global hegemon capable of policing the world 
independently, it sought to confront this challenge in concert with others. 
Next, the interactions between the US and Turkey fit well into the framework 
detailed earlier. During the war, the Soviet Union still  existed. Despite the declining 
fears  of Soviet  aggression,  Turkey still  focused on the importance of maintaining a 
strong relationship with its security 'hub,' America. Beyond the long-standing concerns 
of the USSR, the Turks also had regional fears, for Özal this pertained particularly to 
Iraq,  but also Syria,  Iran,  Greece and Cyprus.  As Turkey was not a great power or 
regional hegemon with massive military capabilities, it sought to maintain assurances 
from the US, its NATO ally; it could not seek major soft-balancing away from the US 
and  NATO  alliance.  Instead,  its  major  concern  was  abandonment—as  detailed  by 
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Grossman above—as well  as entrapment to a certain extent.  Thus the Iraq war was 
arguably  a  synthesis  of  entrapment  and  bandwagoning.  The  Turks,  including  Özal, 
feared the potentially disastrous consequences of an American war with Iraq. However, 
they—principally Özal—also feared an aggressive and expansionist Iraq.
4.2.  The No-Fly Zone and New Ties with the Iraqi Kurds
As the Iraq War ended in February 1991, the refugee crisis in Northern Iraq and 
Southeastern Turkey intensified dramatically. With roughly 500,000 Iraqi Kurds on the 
Turkish border seeking refuge from Saddam Hussein’s ruthlessness, Turkey was on the 
edge  of  an  economic  and  humanitarian  crisis.92 To  help  alleviate  the  humanitarian 
disaster and Turkish concerns, the British began an air campaign in March 1991 that the 
Americans later joined to dissuade Iraqi forces from further attacks. By April 5, 1991, 
the UN had passed Resolution 688 calling on Iraq to end the repression of its people and 
authorizing  the  maintenance  of  a  no-fly  zone  over  the  north  of  Iraq  to  protect  the 
civilian population there. This operation was called Provide Comfort and it lasted until 
July 24, 1991, when Operation Provide Comfort II began. The second operation would 
last until December 31, 1996. Both operations comprised American, British and French 
aircraft and were based out of Turkey. Turkey, and particularly its Incirlik airbase, was 
central to the allied effort to protect the Kurdish region of Iraq, according to Deputy 
Secretary of State Armitage. As noted by Sanberk, the creation of Operation Provide 
Comfort was a major policy success of Özal. Sanberk stated that,
   “[Özal]  understood that there was a convergence of interests  between 
Turkey  and  the  US,  and  he  acted  accordingly.  And  first  and  foremost, 
success was to convince the US, together with the French and the British 
and  the  UN Security  Council  Permanent  Members,  to  create  the  no-fly 
zone.  And  this  was  possible  to  evacuate,  if  I  may say so,  the  500,000 
refugees back to their country and to keep them there. This is his policy. 
And I think it was quite a successful policy. And it was obtained [through] 
trustworthy, personal relations.”93
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By October of 1991, the Kurdish regions of Iraq that were protected by the no-fly zone 
were free from Iraqi military harassment and attained a level of de facto independence. 
Directly  following Operation  Provide  Comfort  II,  the  Americans,  British  and  Turks 
began Operation Northern Watch to maintain the no-fly zone above the 36th parallel 
that would protect this proto-Kurdish Regional Government from Baghdad. This final 
operation would last until the Second Iraq War of 2003.
Besides the initial, predominantly self-interested concerns of the Turks, Turkey 
had  other  reasons  for  supporting  the  no-fly  zone.  To  begin  with,  Turkish  officials 
believed that, if the Iraqi Kurds eventually became reliant upon their goodwill, Turkey 
would be able to encourage them not to formally establish a new state.94 Next, Turkey 
feared  the  potential  support  that  the  de  facto  state  could  provide  for  the  PKK—
particularly as a protected enclave. Additionally, if “Saddam were to crush the Kurds 
again, Turkey might have [had] to face hordes of destabilizing Kurdish refugees once 
more.”95 Furthermore, Turks believed that they would win respect and support from the 
West for doing so, possibly encouraging the EU to expedite membership discussions—
to be discussed at length in a later section. Özal's support for the no-fly zone was in 
spite of repeated statements by Ecevit, ANAP backbencher Ülkü Gökalp Gunay, and 
Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan (among many others) that the creation of an 
eventual Kurdish state was part of a US plan that also included the dismemberment and 
incorporation of Turkish territories.96 Even if  these particular concerns were fanciful, 
they reflected the deep-seated fears of many Turkish officials. Foreign Minister Emre 
Gönensay described a more realistic Turkish fear; that the US did not explicitly want the 
disintegration of Turkey, but rather its weakening by providing the PKK with protection 
and arms.97 He elaborated,  saying that this conspiracy theory reflected the perceived 
belief that the Americans always wanted to have the “PKK card as leverage against 
Turkey because Turkey behaves  sometimes as  a  loose mind.  You never  know what 
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Turkey will do...So perhaps to have this leverage was a way to control Turkey so that it 
would not go into adventurism.”98
To combat these beliefs, America “spent an awful lot of time and effort trying to 
reassure [the Turks] with respect to American policy on behalf of Iraqi integrity, [both] 
territorial  and  political.”99 American  officials  were  always  rhetorically  against  an 
independent Kurdistan, arguing instead that Provide Comfort was only there for aid.100 
Grossman detailed how in all of America's “contacts with the Kurds—and [the US] had 
a lot—[it] always made clear that this was about [the Kurds'] success and their refugee 
return, and helping them keep Saddam off of their backs, but it was not about a Kurdish 
state  in  Northern  Iraq.”101 Nevertheless,  Adair  proposed  reasons  or  potential 
justifications for the Turks' worries—“there was not perfect unanimity within the US 
government.”102 There were some individuals in the executive and legislative branches 
that felt that a “Kurdish state would be a good idea. And Turkish officials were aware of 
that.”103 Although officials—like Ambassadors Grossman, Abramowitz, and Holmes—
always made it clear what official US government policies were, the Turks maintained a 
healthy dose of skepticism and fear of American disingenuity. 
The  lack  of  trust  and  perceived  sense  of  duplicity  on  the  part  of  the  US, 
alongside the continued close cooperation, reflected both the fundamental importance of 
the US alliance, but also Turkey’s anxiety over its own internal and regional security 
and  stability.  After  becoming President  in  1993,  Demirel  reflected  that  the  US had 
allowed the “snakes”104 to come out from under the umbrella, revealing his belief that 
the US action assisted the PKK during the Gulf War. Yet, as President, he did continue 
Özal's military support, reasoning, “what was I to do; damage relations with the United 
States?”105 Afterward,  rumors  of  American  involvement  or  even orchestration  of  the 
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1980 military coup106 or in providing helicopter support to the PKK proliferated.107 Parris 
expanded upon Turkish politicians' habit of absolute opposition when not in government 
transforming to reticent acceptance upon attaining office:
   “It was certainly the case that Prime Minister Ecevit, who had written 
extensively on [his  disapproval  of  the no-fly zone]  when he was in  the 
opposition, did not fundamentally change his viewpoints,  in my opinion, 
after he became Prime Minister. But neither did he act in ways that were 
consistent  with  them.  In  other  words,  he  did  not  change  the  policy,  he 
continued basically what his predecessors had done. Which is to essentially 
accede to ongoing American urging to cooperate with us on maintaining a 
no-fly zone and on maintaining, grosso modo, the integrity of the sanctions 
regime.”108
Parris went on to describe how, although most people were against America's policies 
and Turkey's involvement, the “statesmen” in the military and state understood that they 
must go along with America's policies “at a time when there was only one superpower 
left, where American prestige was at a level that it may never again reach, and where 
intelligent  Turks  understood  that,  by  and  large,  they  had  to  align  themselves  with 
reality.”109 According to Parris, Demirel—“as pro-American a politician as Turkey”110 had 
in the latter half of the 20th century—had a distinct understanding of this necessity. 
According to Sanberk, Turkish-American relations had all been negative once 
Özal left the scene, as demonstrated by innumerable statements by his successors to the 
Presidency  and  Prime  Ministry.111 The  relationship  was  troubled  by  “a  deep,  deep 
mistrust  by the military that the Americans were trying to create a Kurdish state.” 112 
These  sentiments  were  not  only  shared  by  members  of  the  military  and  civilian 
leadership, but also general Turkish public opinion, and were no longer confronted by 
major politicians like Özal. Sanberk flatly stated that the Iraqi Kurdish issues were at 
the heart of the “deterioration of the Turkish-American relations”113 and America's image 
in Turkey during the 1990s. Holmes agreed, arguing that while Provide Comfort and 
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Northern Watch offered the Turks and Americans a chance at near-term cooperation, 
“longer-term, it created the stuff of mythology, which to this day affects the attitude of 
Turks towards the United States.”114 He went on to explain how the Turks frequently 
reiterated the point that the NATO forces were using a Turkish base and that Turkey 
“had the ultimate say with respect to the types of activities that were undertaken there.” 
He expanded that “they never, in that period of time, never came to a period of trust 
with respect to what the US was doing in so far as its relationship with the Kurds of  
Northern Iraq.”115 Nevertheless, Holmes did state that it was the continued strength and 
history of  the relationship,  despite  this  growing distrust,  between the  American and 
Turkish militaries that led to America’s continued maintenance of the no-fly zone even 
after the British and French departed in the late 90s. 
Turkey faced considerable economic obstacles throughout the 1990s beyond the 
many security concerns related to the Iraq War and its aftermath. The continuation of 
the oil embargo and the closure of the border to trade—since “there was a lot of trade 
that  did  not  involve  exports  of  Iraqi  oil”116—cost  the  country  significantly.117 In 
particular, the Southeastern region of Turkey that bordered Iraq experienced a serious 
economic crisis that coincided with—and reinforced—the civil conflict that Turkey had 
been experiencing between Kurdish terrorists (the PKK or Kurdistan Workers Party) 
and the military. As it was an American-led policy to maintain Iraq's isolation, Turkey 
sought economic assistance from America, other NATO allies, and the Arab states that 
had  supported  the  coalition  forces.  However,  significant  financial  support  was  not 
forthcoming, contributing to an already lackluster and crisis-prone Turkish economy in 
the 1990s.  Holmes discussed at  length the issue of Turkish expectations of support, 
American promises of aid, and their general lack of fulfillment:
   “There are people on the American side, who I have talked to, who say 
that they were in the room when promises were made to the Turks that were 
never fulfilled. Those were of an economic variety, of military assistance 
variety, they were of a political-national security variety. Made by a very 
senior  level  people—Secretary of  State  Jim Baker,  the  Chairman  of  the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, but they were not followed up. I shouldn’t say were 
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not followed up; were not fulfilled. When the Turks say that they paid a 
price, they believed that they convinced the US that they were undertaking a 
substantial  risk  for  which  they  needed  to  be  given  assurances  on 
compensation. And many of those assurances of compensation for taking 
those risks were not delivered. It dealt in part with the PKK, but in larger 
part it dealt with the delivery of military goods; it dealt with the delivery of 
financial assistance in the order of, I would say, several billion dollars worth 
of military assistance and financial assistance. Now in fairness, the US has 
always had an explanation for this. It is one thing to say,  we will deliver, 
and it is something else to actually deliver, but you have to understand that 
this  requires  the  budgetary  support  from  the  US Congress  as  well. 
Sometimes that caveat is not understood or as entrenched as the promise 
and assurance in the first place.”118
Prime Minister and True Path Party Leader Tansu Çiller visited the White House 
in 1993 to seek the lifting of the Iraqi embargo to help Turkey economically and to 
prove that its model of secular democracy surpassed that of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. At the time, Vice President Al Gore simply reassured her that the US would help 
financially,  without  ensuring any steps were taken.119 Parris  and Scowcroft  reiterated 
these points, reinforcing how the Turks felt that the US “had simply walked away from 
[its] commitments,”120 and were generally unable to accomplish a great deal proactively 
to ameliorate the situation within Turkey economically.  Even though the US did not 
actively provide additional financial and military aid to Turkey, as the Turks expected, it 
did help in other, indirect, ways. 
According to Ambassador Grossman, a significant effort was made by American 
and NATO forces to utilize Turkish trucks and truck drivers as much as possible to 
move gasoline, food and other supplies to and from military bases. America thus “tried 
to recreate as much of that transport corridor as possible.”121 Furthermore, Grossman, 
President Bill Clinton, and numerous other officials worked hard to support the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Besides providing Turkey a new energy resource and jump-
starting its endeavors to be an energy hub, the pipeline's trajectory would also place it in 
the economically affected areas in a further attempt to ameliorate local conditions. As 
described in greater detail in the next section, it is important to note that the US was a 
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major supporter of the pipeline, partially because the US “felt that [it] owed...Turkey 
some  recompense  for  the  losses  that  they  had  suffered  by  following  the  UN 
resolution.”122 
Ambassador Parris also detailed at length efforts made by the US to overlook 
“fairly flagrant Turkish willingness to enable at least the violation of UN sanctions on 
bringing petroleum products out  of Northern Iraq for sale in Turkey.”123 Despite US 
efforts  internationally  to  isolate  Iraq  diplomatically  and  economically,  American 
officials realized that tacitly facilitating the illicit trade of Iraqi oil from Northern Iraq 
was one of the few significant ways that the US could support Turkey's economy. Parris 
described it “as a quid pro quo essentially for the cooperation [the US was] getting in 
the military sphere.”124 While Turkish authorities never mentioned this seeming trade, 
Parris felt confident that they were well aware of the situation. This effort to mitigate 
Turkey's economic costs stemming from the embargo also factored into another issue at 
the time: Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish relations. Although most of the oil “product was 
coming  from  areas  that  were  beyond  Kurdish  control...[it  was]  going  out  through 
Northern  Iraq,  which  was  essentially  KDP controlled.”125 The  KDP,  the  Kurdistan 
Democratic  Party,  led  by  Massoud  Barzani  and  the  PUK,  the  Patriotic  Union  of 
Kurdistan, led by Jalal Talabani, were the two primary competing Kurdish militia-cum-
parties  in  Northern  Iraq.  Their  personal  and  familial  rivalries  were—and  remain—
immense. According to Parris, the trade was having “a positive impact...in the North, 
where it was an American objective to protect and to guarantee as prosperous a life as 
one  could  have  under  the  circumstances.”126 Furthermore,  it  “was  having  a  salutary 
effect on Southeast Turkey and on the terrorism problem as well.”127 Thus the tacitly-
approved smuggling of Iraqi oil through Northern Iraq to Turkey effectively entwined 
Turkey further in Kurdish politics and helped to strengthen the hand of Barzani and his 
KDP. 
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As Saddam's forces faded from being the primary concern in the north, the Turks 
and Americans began to focus in earnest on internal Iraqi Kurdish politics and their 
relations with Turkey and America. Throughout the post-Iraq War 1990s, the US played 
a significant role in attempting to mediate relations between the two competing Kurdish 
factions. Part of this mediation effort stemmed from the American desire that the Kurds 
maintain a united front against any military endeavors from Saddam. The US sought the 
peaceful and democratic development of the northern region as an example of what a 
Saddam-free Iraq could potentially attain. Additionally, the US believed that a Kurdish 
region at peace could help mitigate Turkish concerns over both a free Iraqi Kurdistan 
and also elements  of  the  PKK utilizing  a  poorly governed region to  attack Turkish 
territory. However, this dream of peaceful and amenable development was not to be. 
The KDP and PUK fought a civil war in the mid-90s. According to Holmes, “the PKK, 
the KDP, and the PUK, and the Turks...had a constantly shifting set of alliances and 
arrangements and [played] one side off against the other,”128 throughout this time period. 
The KDP even allied with Saddam for a time period to oust the PUK from Erbil. 
For much of the 1990s, Turkey sought out accommodations with Barzani and 
Talabani in an effort to combat the threat of PKK terrorism in Turkey. According to 
Sanberk,  Barzani  and  Talabani,  while  trying  to  prove  their  aversion  to  separatist 
terrorism in  Turkey,  fought  against  the  PKK in  the  early  and  mid-1990s  to  try  to 
ameliorate  tensions  with  Turkey.129 He commented  on how the  Kurds  “were always 
eager to have good relations”130 with the Turks and that they knew that their interests 
could  best  be  supported  by  a  strong  relationship  with  Turkey.  However,  Sanberk 
reflected that there was “huge mismanagement”131 in conducting Turkish outreach to the 
Kurds  due  to  the  heavy  involvement  of  a  distrustful  Turkish  military,  particularly 
amongst the middle and lower ranked officials actually making frequent contact. Thus, 
Turkish efforts to mediate the conflicts between the two parties—as seen in the Ankara 
process of negotiations  in 1997—failed and the Turkish influence was reduced to a 
certain  extent.  Yet,  Turkey  did  attain  one  significant  and  tangible  result  from  its 
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diplomatic endeavors, the agreement by the KDP and PUK to allow Turkey to maintain 
a base in Northern Iraq filled with Special Forces troops. This base provided Turkey 
with an enhanced capacity to gather intelligence and plan military strikes against PKK 
forces  more  accurately.132 Although  the  base  was  of  “doubtful  legality”133 under 
international law, the US provided tacit approval for its continued existence as a way to 
support Turkey against the PKK. 
Nonetheless,  by the end of that year,  attempts  to pacify the internal  Kurdish 
conflict  fell  to the Americans and British primarily.134 Although American leadership 
may have helped the Kurds to settle their differences—demonstrated by the Washington 
Agreement in September 1998 stipulating the sharing of power and revenue—it bred 
distrust among Turkish officials of American priorities and goals since the Turks would 
“have  to  follow from behind.”135 However,  Barzani  and  Talabani  had  agreed  to  the 
allowance  of  a  small  number  of  Turkish  troops  to  be  stationed  in  Northern  Iraq. 136 
According  to  Holmes,  these  forces  were  Turkish  Special  Forces  and  were  there  to 
conduct or coordinate strikes against PKK threats in Iraqi territory.137 Additionally, they 
successfully  penetrated  the  Kurds  in  Northern  Iraq  with  their  intelligence  people.138 
Holmes stated that the reason that the Kurdish leaders approved of their presence was to 
ensure  the  withdrawal  of  many  more  Turkish  troops  after  one  of  Turkey's  larger 
operations towards the end of the Kurdish civil war.139 Despite the fact that America had 
attempted to  assist  the Turks in their  efforts  to chart  a  path to peace in  the Ankara 
process, the Turks never fully trusted the Americans in their endeavors at negotiations.140 
Despite  considerable  American  and Turkish-led  efforts  at  negotiations  in  the 
early and mid-90s, there were also numerous instances of Turkish military actions to 
target PKK members and bases in Northern Iraq, as mentioned above. This stemmed 
from three major factors. First, the no-fly zone meant that the Iraqi central government 
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could not maintain and control its own borders. Second, the confrontations within the 
Kurdish parties meant that their attention—and that of their military forces—primarily 
lay with each other  and not  with potential  terrorists  and terrorist  bases  within their 
territory. Lastly, the shifting alliances during the time period meant that at some points, 
one or the other of the Iraqi Kurdish parties might be supporting the PKK. This was 
particularly true of the PUK, for a substantial amount of the period. Thus, the proto-
Kurdish Regional Government, under the leadership of Barzani, had at numerous points 
expressed its intentions to combat the PKK together with the Turks.141 Consequently, 
there were several major operations conducted by the Turks to confront the PKK threat 
involving the cooperation of Barzani.142 Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the alliances 
shifted dramatically from instance to instance.  According to Armitage,  “Barzani has 
been on and off sides with the Turkish government from time to time. He has been on 
all sides of the issue.”143
During  this  time  period,  the  US approach  to  Turkish-Kurdish  relations  was 
constantly under stress. At various moments the Americans sought to actively facilitate 
improved  relations,  and  at  others  they  intentionally  reduced  contact  so  as  not  to 
antagonize  the  Turks.  For  example,  at  one point  early on,  Ambassador  Abramowitz 
conveyed  a  message  to  Washington  stating  that  he  wanted  to  talk  to  Talabani.  In 
response, the State Department said “absolutely not, the Turks will get excited.” 144 This 
sentiment was in spite of the fact that Özal was actively consulting both Barzani and 
Talabani at the time in private. Nevertheless, the Turkish fears of America potentially 
negotiating with the Kurds against its wishes—either intentionally or unintentionally—
led  to  US-Kurdish  relations  being  a  function  of  the  US-Turkish  relationship.  To 
ameliorate the tension and distrust between Turkey and the US, the US actively shared 
information and intelligence. However the “Turks never believed that they got all of the 
information  that  the  US  had.  They  never  believed  they  [the  US  was  not]  up  to 
something that they didn't know about.”145 To improve relations, the US designated the 
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PKK as a terrorist organization, which helped to restrict its capacities internationally. 146 
Nevertheless, according to Holmes—and partially vindicating the Turks' distrust—the 
US “consistently during that decade denied [Turkey] actionable intelligence, as a matter 
of policy,”147 primarily due to the harsher and more military-oriented approach that the 
Turks pursued in comparison to the American penchant for treating it as a policing issue 
at that time. The Turks resented America's withholding this type of information and felt 
that  it  was  inconsistent  with  America's  declaration  of  the  PKK  as  a  terrorist 
organization.
Besides tacitly approving the multiple Turkish invasions of Northern Iraq, the 
US also “closed its eyes”148 “to some perfectly awful Turkish military activities in the 
Southeast”  of  Turkey.149 The  Executive  Branch of  the  US government  even stymied 
Congressional efforts to cut off military assistance to Turkey because of military human 
rights abuses. Holmes reflected that the US facilitated Turkey's military endeavors in 
Northern Iraq not so much in actual additional,  direct military assistance,  but in the 
maintenance  of  the  existing  military  aid.150 Grossman  summarized  the  American 
perspective at the time well:
   “The US preferred that Turkey not send its troops into Northern Iraq, but 
given  the  terrorist  threat  from  the  PKK  and  the  fact  that  the  central 
government in Iraq was not able to impose its own control over the area, I 
think a lot of people, certainly in the first Bush administration, understood 
that, you know, if we were fighting terrorists and sometimes acted militarily, 
than the Turks sometimes had that requirement as well”151
Once the Turks proved unsuccessful at compelling Barzani and Talabani to make 
peace, the US lost its reticence for active engagement in the political process. The US 
facilitated contact “in Northern Iraq, but also in Ankara with each of the gentlemen 
separately, and on at least a couple of occasions, together.”152 The US constantly tried to 
encourage dialogue between the two Kurdish leaders themselves and between them and 
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the Turks throughout the period and into the 2000s. The peak of this facilitation was 
arguably  when  former  US  Secretary  of  State  Madeleine  Albright  brought  Barzani, 
Talabani and the Turks to Washington DC to negotiate the Washington Agreement in 
1998.153 According to Holmes, both leaders met with US Vice President Al Gore during 
this  trip,  reflecting  the  importance  that  the  US  placed  on  resolving  their  issues. 
Significantly,  the  simple  act  of  getting  the  Kurds  to  Washington  was  a  feat  of 
international  cooperation,  since  they  had  to  travel  through  Turkey.  According  to 
Holmes, the US intervened to urge Turkey to allow them to travel. “They facilitated 
it...at one point they even issued Turkish passports for their travel.”154
The relationship between Turkey and the US during the post-Iraq War period 
was emblematic of the many of the fears of abandonment and entrapment. Due to the 
rapid switch from Soviet or Iraqi aggression to an unstable and terrorist-laden Northern 
Iraq, Turkey maintained a need for a strong security tie to the unipolar power—the US. 
The  significant  “asymmetric...distribution  of  capabilities  within  [the]  alliance”155 
allowed the alliance leader—the US—to dictate policy to a great degree. This command 
of  policy  fed  on  existing  Turkish  distrust  of  the  US  and  even  provided  new 
opportunities for conspiracy theories and fears of betrayal to spread. Having already 
been 'entrapped,' to a certain degree, in the Iraqi War and its aftermath, Turkey had few 
opportunities to defect to another pole or attempt to band together with other smaller 
states to counteract US policy, given its reliance on American cooperation to maintain 
its territorial security. Despite Turkey's reliance upon American intelligence to assist in 
fighting the PKK, “officials complained that this [was] not real time”156 and actionable 
intelligence, a concern that would not be addressed until the end of 2007. It would only 
be  in  the  first  decade  of  the  21st Century  that  Turkey felt  confident  enough  in  its 
relations with the Kurds of Northern Iraq to countenance a shift in American relations. 
Beyond  Turkey's  entrapment  and  abandonment  concerns,  American  policy  towards 
post-War Iraq maintained the conservative approach to  the international  institutional 
system.  The  US  still  sought  and  relied  upon  UN  approval  for  the  no-fly  zone  of 
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Northern Iraq and definitely declared that it was against such revisionist policies like the 
fracturing of Iraq into ethnic or sectarian statelets. 
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5.  A NEW ACTIVISM, FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO THE BALKANS
5.1.  Central Asia and Azerbaijan
While the Iraq War and its aftermath certainly were the priorities in US-Turkish 
relations during the 1990s, they were not the only factors. One key realm of cooperation 
and encouragement between the two sides was Turkey's expanding foreign policy to the 
newly independent, former Soviet Republics. Turkey's outreach extended to nearly all of 
these  states,  excluding  Armenia  for  the  most  part.  However,  Turkey's  policies  and 
motivations regarding Azerbaijan and the Turkic republics in Central Asia were most 
significant in establishing the potential for US-Turkish cooperation. Turkey's assistance 
to these states began quickly as the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991; although it was an 
independent policy, the US certainly encouraged it. Turkey's new foreign policy to these 
states  had  numerous  origins  that  conveniently  supported  and  reinforced  aspects  of 
American policies at that time. To begin with, from the Turkish perspective, these states, 
as ethnically Turkic, were considered a natural regional ally, so that the Turks “naturally 
wanted to extend [a] hand to”157 them. According to Sanberk, Özal had a concrete policy 
framework in mind from the onset. He “thought that Turkey must immediately start to 
create new channels”158 of contact and communication. Although Turkey maintained its 
policy not  to engage in the civil  conflicts  or wars between these states,  it  “became 
politically and diplomatically very active.”159 
This course of action included the opening of airspace and traffic routes, the 
extension  of  various  forms  of  communication  and  cultural  exchange  such as  telex, 
telephone and television,  and establishing lines of “export to  allow the exchange of 
people, traders,...trade, credit lines, and energy.”160 From the beginning, Turkey—first 
under  Özal,  but  continuing  under  his  successors—sought  bilateral  agreements  with 
these newly independent states, tying them to the outside world and market via Turkey. 
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Indeed, this general outreach was not just Turkish policy, it was also encouraged by the 
US. The US saw in Turkey an opportunity to assist these newly independent states to 
make the transition to market-based democracies and integrate into the global economy 
and  Western  World.161 Additionally,  according  to  Abramowitz,  the  American 
encouragement to support Central Asia reflected rhetoric to try to reassure the Turks that 
the US would not lose interest with Turkey now that the Cold War had ended.162
The US and Turkey did differ, however, in their expectations and understanding 
of  the  situation.  While  the  Turks  “had  this  notion  that  Turkey  would  lead...the 
resurrection  of  a  Turkish  speaking,  Turkish  culturally  identifiable  entity,”163 the  US 
understood that this ideal was a utopian dream. According to Holmes, the Turks were 
disappointed that the US would not be an active partner in the promotion of this policy, 
but he felt that “they fairly quickly began to see that it was extremely costly and not 
likely to go any place, and that these countries were going to choose their own allies and 
directions...quite apart from what Ankara urged upon them.”164 According to Grossman, 
American officials including Armitage—who was handling US policies to these states—
encouraged the Turks to go there in earnest and work to modernize these states.165 He felt 
that the Turks did a “very smart thing,”166 by sending bankers,  business people,  and 
others to these countries.
The Americans warned the Turks not to expect open arms and ready acceptance 
of  Turkey as  the “big brother”167 to  these states,  since they had just  “got rid  of  big 
brother and they probably [did] not want another one.”168 So, while their motivations 
were well-intentioned,  the Turks were underwhelmed by the welcome they received 
from the post-Soviet states. To a great degree, these states also remained culturally and 
economically  integrated  to  Russia,  who  worked  to  counteract  the  Turkish  outreach 
which it saw as antagonistic.169 Additionally, Grossman reflected that the Turks who had 
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visited these states were shocked at the conditions of their economies and countries. 
Unlike many American officials and business people who may have had exposure to the 
Eastern  Bloc  at  various  times,  the  Turks  had  little  such  first-hand  experience  with 
Communist  countries.  Thus,  Turks  returned  in  the  first  few  years  saying  “oh  my 
goodness, we had no idea how backward this was.”170 Grossman expanded, saying:
   “[They were]  shocked by how backward it  was  and what  a  disaster, 
human  disaster,  communism  was.  Well  they  adjusted  themselves  and 
figured what kind of work could be done. So they realized that they would 
have to raise a pretty profound foundation out there.”171
Despite the horrid conditions of these states at the time, some Turkish businesses 
proved successful,  including construction,  transportation,  trucking,  and food service. 
This business achievement reflected joint US and Turkish goals of attempting to redirect 
these states diplomatically and strategically from Russia to the West, which varied in 
degree  from state  to  state.  According  to  Adair,  the  achievements  stemmed  from a 
budding symbiotic relationship:
“Turkey, theoretically at least, could help to introduce trade and free market 
concepts to that region. And the region in turn could offer opportunities for 
increased trade and increased economic growth. And that would promote 
prosperity  and  hopefully  democracy  in  Central  Asia.  And  from  our 
perspective, would also serve to strengthen ties with the West. So in all of 
those—all of that was a good thing.”172
Without  a  doubt,  the  outreach  and  economic  ties  between  Azerbaijan  and  Turkey 
flourished relative to the other states, in large part due to its contiguity with Turkey.173 
While Turkey's economic ties to these states expanded to one degree or another, 
ties  with  Armenia  became  progressively  worse.  Turkish-Armenian,  Azerbaijani-
Armenian,  or  American-Armenian  relations  each  proved  likewise  complicated  and 
crisis-prone. Although a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth 
briefly summarizing the various crises and how they impacted and were affected by the 
US-Turkish relationship. Armenia and diaspora Armenians supported efforts to declare 
the  mass  deaths  and killings  of  Armenians  during  the  First  World  War  a  Genocide 
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committed by the Ottoman Empire—to which Turkey was the successor state legally 
and  historically.  Because  of  the  large  diaspora  population  in  America,  Armenian-
Americans had proved somewhat successful at influencing US policies to the region.174 
Although neither  President  Clinton nor  Congress  at  the time had ever  declared it  a 
Genocide,  the  issue's  frequent  appearance  in  the  legislative  agenda  made  for  tense 
relations  between  the  US and  Turkey.  Nevertheless,  when  Armenia  and  Azerbaijan 
fought a war in the early 1990s over Nagorno-Karabakh, the US imposed “sanctions on 
Azerbaijan,  even  though  Armenia  was  responsible  for  the  conflict...[due  to]  the 
Armenian lobby” in America, which was very powerful.175 Early on in the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict Turkey closed its border to Armenia in support of Azerbaijan. This 
closure provided one of the first, but certainly not the last, points of conflict between the 
US and Turkey over Armenia.176 A USAID train en route to Yerevan, Armenia got as far 
as Kars, near the Turkish border with Armenia, before being unable to move any further 
because of the closed border. 
Upon arriving in Turkey in 1992, Holmes leveraged Turkey's ties with the US to 
open  the  border  for  that  one  train.  Although  it  was  allowed  to  pass,  “it  was  an 
illustration”177 of  the  problems  that  would  repeatedly  crop  up  between  the  US  and 
Turkey and made it “quite apparent that the US was going to pay a price and be blamed 
for  an  awful  lot  of  Eurasian  problems  that  Turkey had  because  of  the  Azerbaijan-
Armenia problem.”178 Despite the Turks' perception that the US played a disruptive role 
when it came to Armenia, Sanberk felt that the US also provided a positive function. 
According to him, the US-Turkish relationship was what sparked and maintained most 
of the attempts at reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia throughout the 90s and 
into  the  new century.  Although  they did  not  provide  a  long-term resolution  to  the 
problem, the relationship did help to deescalate conflicts and reduce tension, to a certain 
extent.179
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The US supported Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan to the chagrin of both 
the  Azerbaijanis  and the  Turks.  At  the  same time,  America  played  a  major  role  in 
developing the natural resource infrastructure that would prove pivotal to Azerbaijan 
and  Turkey—the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  Oil  Pipeline.  According  to  Sanberk,  when 
Ambassador Grossman arrived at his post in Ankara, he sought to change how the US 
viewed its relations with Turkey. Unlike in the previous era when Turkey's importance 
to the US was “always a function of other regions,” 180 Grossman created,  fought for 
State Department approval, and brought to fruition a series of actionable policies that 
had Turkey at their heart.181 The primary point was the development of the pipeline—
with efforts at assisting Turkey's admittance to the EU a close second. The pipeline from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey through Georgia had three primary justifications for its massive 
US support. 
The first motivation for the US to assist in the pipeline's construction was as a 
form of  payback  to  the  Turks  for  the  costs  of  the  Iraq  War  and  the  no-fly  zone.  
According  to  Grossman,  the  pipeline  was  an  effort  to  “show  Turks  that  [the  US] 
understood that they had taken an economic hit and [that] this was one way to try to 
balance  that  checkbook.”182 Although the  US government  did  not  provide  any funds 
directly or indirectly (via OPIC)183 to the construction of the pipeline, the government 
expended “a huge amount of effort over many years...from President Bush, President 
Clinton,  Secretaries  of  State,  everybody,”184 to  ensure  that  the  project  went  to 
completion.  These  many  years  of  multifaceted  effort  became  “one  of  the 
prime...loadstones  of  US-Turkish  strategic  cooperation  ultimately.”185 Türkmen  went 
further,  arguing that the “pipeline was really achieved thanks to President  Clinton...
[because] he worked very hard also to convince the [oil] companies”186 to invest in the 
project.  Beyond the  initial  investment,  the  transit  of  oil  through  its  territory would 
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provide Turkey with an additional revenue stream.187 According to Armitage, who had 
retired from public  service and was actively working on the pipeline project  in  the 
private sector in the latter half of the 90s, the US applied pressure on the consortium, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the EU to ensure that the project went to fruition.188 
According to Gönensay, who spearheaded much of Turkish policy regarding the 
pipeline in the early and mid-1990s, the American government's assistance was key in 
ensuring that the oil went through Turkey as opposed to through Russia. American and 
other  Western  oil  companies  had  originally  and  consistently  sought  to  export 
Azerbaijani energy through the existing infrastructure through Russia to Europe so as 
not  to  rile  their  relationships and forthcoming business opportunities  with Russia.189 
Gönensay reflected that at the final meeting in London to set the pipeline’s route, the 
American companies were not going with the existing plan and intended to use Russia 
instead.190 It  was  only  through  Gönensay's  working  with  Deputy  National  Security 
Adviser Sandy Berger's office in the US National Security Council that they were able 
to pressure the companies to stick to the Turkish route.191 
The second motivation was to assist Turkey in forging stronger relations with the 
former Soviet states and in  creating “the economic means of ensuring that the former 
republics did not again become dependencies of Russia as they had been of the Soviet 
Union.”192 The  pipeline  would  reinforce  the  economic  outreach,  efforts  towards 
economic modernization, and attempts at opening up to the global market amongst the 
newly independent states that Turkey was pursuing. According to Parris, “Turkey and 
America were in strategic terms working very closely and shared a common strategic 
vision  in  many  respects,  which  was  anti-Russian  in  its  focus.”193 Thus,  the  final 
motivation  for  the  American  leadership  and  support  for  the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline reflected this anti-Russian and pro-western integration directive.194
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The third factor was to “strengthen ties between Central Asia [and Azerbaijan] 
and the West.”195 The pipeline was the first to tie the EU and the Caspian Sea region 
together via Turkey, instead of Russia. It consequently jump-started Turkey's role as an 
energy hub; “Turkey probably would not be nearly as relevant with respect to global 
energy as it is today without [this] connection.”196It was the start of a new east-west 
energy corridor  that  continues  to  develop to  this  day.  A part  of  the  impetus  to  this 
development was the aforementioned anti-Russian sentiment. “Multiple pipelines had 
been a policy decision,”197 for the US which tried to expand the opportunities for both 
the providers  (former Soviet  states) and consumers  (EU) to  bypass Russia  with the 
intention that Russia would lose some of its capacity to use its energy resources and 
pipelines as a diplomatic weapon.198 Furthermore,  American officials, such as Adair, 
believed that economic and energy ties such as these would help in Turkey's efforts to 
gain admission to the EU—another US priority during the 90s.199
Overall, despite continuous tensions regarding Turkey and America's respective 
relations with Armenia, the Turkish opening to the former Soviet states proved to be a 
successful  area  of  cooperation  between  the  US  and  Turkey.  Although  certainly  a 
Turkey-led initiative,  the opening to former Soviet states held strategic rationale for 
both the US and Turkey and provided an opportunity for them to ameliorate some of the 
tension  built  up  over  Iraq.  As  detailed  above,  the  foreign  policy  opening  reflected 
American desires to further enmesh Turkey within its sphere of influence (liberal market 
states), to compensate it for the costs that it suffered related to Iraq, and to preemptively 
combat the resurgence of a Russian threat. 
To the Turks, the outreach supported primarily two arguably opposing policies 
anticipated  by  the  theoretical  framework.  First,  the  foreign  policy  initiative  offered 
Turkey the opportunity to attempt to 'soft-balance' away from the US by building ties 
with former Soviet states. While the outreach was successful overall, it did not reach the 
heights of cooperation and fraternal ties that many Turkish politicians—particularly the 
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ultra-ethnonationalists—thought  possible.  Nevertheless,  it  did  provide  Turkey  the 
opportunity  to  strengthen  ties  with  Europe,  which,  while  in  the  US  'camp,'  was 
independent and could act as a counterweight to unpopular American policies. However, 
this  desire  for  a  broader  range of  potential  allies  amongst  the  post-Soviets  and the 
Europeans was also an American priority for Turkey. As such, Turkey's rationally self-
interested  policies  simultaneously  reinforced  its  ties  with  its  'alliance  security  hub,' 
potentially  reducing  Turkish  fears  of  abandonment.  Even  with  these  symbiotically-
reinforcing policies, US-Turkish relations could not overcome long-standing and newly 
arising aspects of distrust. Although suspicion did not figure prominently in most of the 
largely positive or at least neutral relations, the Armenian circumstances unquestionably 
added to that the rationale of the Turkish public and officials to distrust the US or see 
ulterior motives and conspiracy theories behind US actions and policies. 
5.2.  The Balkans and NATO Intervention 
As with the post-Soviet states, Turkey's outreach to the Balkans provided the 
opportunity for positive and active cooperation with the US dealing with a strategic 
imperative.  However,  unlike  Central  Asia  and the  Caucasus,  the  Balkans—being in 
Southeastern Europe—were clearly within the sphere of influence of both the EU and 
NATO, dramatically shifting how US-Turkish interactions and policies were instituted. 
Instead of primarily being a bilaterally-focused relationship with ad hoc outreach to 
other  states,  relations  were  firmly entrenched within  the  NATO,  EU,  and even  UN 
architectures For Turkey, the US, and the EU, the Balkans provided an early example, 
right in the middle of the 'West,' that the post-Cold War period would not see the 'end of 
history.' This phrase, coined by Francis Fukuyama, illustrated the concept that the world 
had entered a new era in which liberal, democratic, and market-based countries that 
respected individualism and pluralism would reign supreme. Instead, the upheaval in the 
Balkans,  and  more  specifically,  the  disintegration  of  Yugoslavia,  demonstrated  that 
instead of a global clash of the free-market versus communism, the international system 
would be riven by ethnic, religious, or otherwise identity-based conflicts. To a certain 
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extent,  this  was  supported  by  Samuel  Huntington's  'Clash  of  Civilizations'  theories 
arguing that world civilizations (like the Judeo-Christian West) would be the primary 
competitors in the post-Cold War period.
Turkey's approach to the conflict in Yugoslavia progressed through three stages. 
First, Turkey, like the US and the EU, was firmly against the break up of Yugoslavia 
into its constitutive parts.200 Nevertheless, as Slovenia and Croatia fought for and won 
their independence from the Serbian dominated Yugoslav federal army, the EU and US 
chose to recognize their freedom.201 Turkey quickly followed suit, recognizing all four 
breakaway  republics,  including  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  Macedonia.  The  initial 
reticence  to  support  Slovenian  and  Croatian  independence  stemmed primarily  from 
Turkey's  fear  of  a  similar  separatist  movement  within  Turkey  gaining  international 
support  and  diplomatic  recognition  as  the  idea  of  ethnic  or  religious  nationalism 
regained prominence.202 Turkey was also concerned with a potential flood of refugees, 
the loss of trade to the EU that went through these territories, and also uncertainty with 
respect to turning its back on a former ally (Yugoslavia had been supportive of ethnic 
Turks when Bulgaria instituted ethno-nationalist policies in the 1980s). 
The second stage of Turkey's response to the Balkan crises occurred as the ethnic 
and religious fighting worsened in Bosnia.  Both the Turkish government and public 
were highly concerned with the violence in Bosnia and the effect that it was having on 
Bosnia's Muslim population. This was particularly true given that “a large number of 
Turks  of  Bosnian  origin  were  living  in  Turkey.”203 Turkey  thus  actively  advocated 
through  “multilateral—rather  than  bilateral—actions  (NATO,  UN,  or  Islamic 
Conference Organization)”204 in defense of Bosnia.  Among Turkey's  complaints were 
that the multilateral organizations of the West were acting like Christian clubs and that 
the UN arms embargo was “punishing the Bosnian government by denying Bosnia-
Herzegovina the ability to defend its own territory.”205 It thus submitted an action plan to 
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the UN on August 7, 1992 to adopt a more “active and serious stance”206 against Serbia. 
Turkey,  although  distressed  with  the  sluggish  response  from the  US,  EU,  and  UN, 
nevertheless continued to support and press for a multilateral response. Furthermore, 
acting as a broker between the Bosnians and Croats in November 1993, Turkey began to 
help  enforce  the  no-fly  zone  that  same  year,  contributed  to  the  American-led 
Washington agreement of March 1994, took part in the bombing of the Serbian forces 
surrounding Sarajevo, and sent 100 troops to Zenica to participate with the subsequent 
UN protection forces.207 Following the US-led Dayton Peace Agreement  in  1995,  of 
which it  was a major supporter,  Turkey would also play a large role in training the 
Bosnian-Croation Federation army.208 
The final stage of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Balkans occurred during 
the  Serbian  war  with  its  breakaway  province  of  Kosovo  (which  declared  formal 
independence in 2008, although it is still not formally recognized by Serbia). Unlike in 
Bosnia, Turkey “viewed the Kosovo crisis primarily in terms of its impact on regional 
stability and order.”209 It was a notably more restrained response than that to Bosnia, 
stemming in part “from the fact that the ethnic Turkish minority in Kosovo...did not ally 
themselves with the Albanians and had genuine concerns about being dominated by the 
Albanian majority.”210 Although Turkey was not active in diplomacy, it did comply with 
NATO's  sanctions  against  Serbia,  deployed  F-16  jets  in  the  air  campaign,  and 
contributed 1,000 troops to the UN peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. 
Despite the early concerns by the Turks that the US, NATO, and EU were not  
responding  fast  or  adequately  enough  to  the  crisis  in  Bosnia,  they  did  appreciate 
American  policy  and  its  results  in  the  end.211 Parris,  reflecting  on  the  American 
perspective,  felt  that  “Turkey  and  America  were,  in  strategic  terms,  working  very 
closely and shared a common strategic vision”212 that helped to encourage cooperation 
and  dialogue  with  the  US  in  regional  issues  outside  of  Iraq.  Grossman  concurred, 
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arguing that Turkey played a key role in the negotiations in preparation for Dayton. He 
commented  on  how  “the  early  negotiations  to  get  ready  for  Dayton  with  Alija 
Izetbegović took place in my living room in Ankara.”213 Furthermore, he stated that: 
   “President Demirel in particular was a great supporter of [Holbrooke's] 
efforts to bring an end to the Balkan—to the War in Bosnia. I would say that 
a lot of that took place in Turkey. There was a very dramatic moment in 
[Holbrooke's]  book  where,  while  they  are  in  Dayton,  we  needed  Prime 
Minister  Demirel  to  call  Izetbegović  and  he  does.  So  they  played  an 
important role in all of that.”214
As with its outreach to the post-Soviet states,  Turkey's  diplomacy and active 
engagement in the conflicts within the Balkans provided it with a chance to bolster its 
relationship with the US, improve its standing within the NATO security alliance, and 
offer an opportunity to engage with EU member states on a key European issue that did 
not  revolve  around  Cyprus,  Greece,  or  Turkey  itself.  These  mutually  nonexclusive 
relationships allowed Turkey to reassert its importance within the Atlanticist security 
architecture  and  develop  its  credentials  as  an  active  defender  and  supporter  of 
democratic  and  pluralistic  societies.  This  further  enmeshment  within  Western 
multilateral organizations was actively encouraged by the US, which sought to ensure 
that Turkey remained within its geostrategic sphere of influence. Thus, similarly to the 
Central  Asian  and  Caucasian  example,  Turkey  sought  to  both  maintain  and  even 
improve its military and diplomacy-based cooperation with the US-led NATO alliance 
while  simultaneously attempting to soft-balance away to enhance its  ties with some 
Balkan states and the EU. For the US, it continued to encourage Turkey's outreach to the 
EU as well as the Balkans as an attempt to further enmesh it within Western liberal 
democratic  and  market-based  institutions  and  norms.  However,  unlike  the  Iraqi 
example, the American approach to the international system reflected both conservative 
and revisionist desires. The US continued to utilize the UN institutional architecture to 
seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis and, barring that, military and sanctions-based 
support for its end. However, it pursued aspects of a revisionist policy in its support for 
the fragmentation and independence of the Yugoslav Republics. Although the US had 
traditionally been against such secessionist endeavors, the rapid pace of events and the 
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relative lack of concerted opposition from American allies in the region to independence 
movements helped to justify and support America's role. 
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6.  RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, IRAN, AND SYRIA
In the 1990s, Turkey’s foreign policy towards other states in the Middle East 
besides Iraq provided similar opportunities for cooperation and trust-building between 
the US and Turkey that its outreach to the post-Soviet states had provided. This proved 
particularly true and beneficial when it came to its policies towards Israel, Iran, and 
Syria—three of the more contentious states in the region, albeit for differing reasons. 
Undoubtedly, the rapid improvement in Turkish-Israeli ties during this time period was 
the  most  consequential  of  the  three  relationships.  This  transformation  reflected  the 
numerous means by which Turkey and Israel could profit from each other's security in 
the  region,  as  well  as  the  advantages  that  Turkey  could  receive  via  Israel  in  its 
relationship with the US.  As with the historical US-Turkish relationship, ties between 
Turkey and Israel were based on military-military cooperation and high level civilian 
consultation  over  broad-based  societal  and  economic  bonds.215 To  the  Turks,  Israel 
provided military arms assistance and intelligence to help confront Kurdish separatism 
both  in  Turkey and  Iraq,  counter  regional  support  for  extreme  Islamic  groups,  and 
bolster  Turkey's  modern  and  secular  credentials  in  the  eyes  of  the  West.  This  was 
particularly crucial for the military, which was leading this effort and considered itself 
“the custodians of the true Turkish state”216 and its secular character. The military and its 
allies in the state bureaucracy and media feared the rise of “religious reactionism”217—
religious conservative political and societal actors whom they feared would change the 
nature of the Turkish Republic. The military's concerns grew with the rise of the Refah 
(Welfare) Party, which was Islamist in character; there was consequently a military coup 
in 1997, addressed in greater detail in a later section. Nevertheless, to Turkey's armed 
forces, Israel proved a key ally and source of support for its domestic considerations. 
Internationally,  Israel  was  Turkey's  regional  ally  in  a  neighborhood  full  of 
potential  threats,  including  Iran,  Iraq,  Syria,  Greece  and  even  the  ongoing  Cyprus 
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conflict. Israel provided the Turks with arms and weapon systems that were beneficial to 
the security of both states.  Because there were certain weapons systems that Turkey 
desired  of  which  Congress  forbade  American  export,  Turkey  saw  “Israel  as  an 
alternative source.”218 According to Holmes, although “American industry lost in some 
sales contracts that went to Israel instead, [the US] didn’t fuss about it. [It] didn’t fight 
for the American industry as long as it went to Israeli industry instead.” 219 For Israel, 
Turkey provided a democratic and majority Muslim ally in a region full of hostile states 
and could assist Israel in confronting both state and non-state actors that threatened its 
security. Scowcroft bluntly stated that “it was helpful policy to have a Muslim state with 
friendly relations with Israel; it was useful so [the US] encouraged it.” 220 Furthermore, 
“The military of course liked Israel for its military arms, etc. but also because they stuck 
it  to  the  Islamics.”221 Additionally,  according  to  Sanberk,  there  was  some  latent 
appreciation  on  the  part  of  the  Turks  regarding  the  experiences  of  Jews  under  the 
Ottoman Empire, where there were no “pogroms, never,”222 up through World War II. 
“Although Turkey [in that war] was impartial...its people played a role”223 in assisting in 
the clandestine removal of European Jews from danger. As relations improved following 
the start of official diplomatic ties in March 1992, Israeli tourism to Turkey increased 
dramatically.  This  marginally  helped  Turkey economically,  but  more  importantly,  it 
provided the opportunity for bonds to begin to develop at a societal level.
Numerous military to military accords and deals that were signed at the time 
represented the official extent of the relationship. The first such accord took place in 
February  1996  without  the  consent  or  knowledge  of  its  details  by  the  Minister  of 
Defense.224 This reflected how important the Turkish Armed Forces placed its ties to 
Israel  such  that  it  bypassed  the  civilian  government  to  ensure  its  passage.  There 
followed a defense industry accord in August, this time signed by the Refah government 
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despite its personal desires to end such cooperation.225 Beyond domestic and regional 
security, Israel also aided Turkey in its relations with the US both indirectly and directly. 
Indirectly,  since  Israel  was  a  major  ally of  the  US and many European states  in  a 
troubling neighborhood, Turkey saw potential to improve relations with these states by 
assisting Israel.
Directly, the relationship had three factors. First, Turkey “saw Israel as a means 
of exerting countervailing pressure in Congress on groups that they viewed as hostile 
towards  Turkey—primarily  responses  to  Armenian  and Greek lobbies  in”226 the  US. 
According to Holmes, “the Israeli lobby, AIPAC...was thoroughly on board with that 
and a lot of help was given to Turkey with respect to issues like the Armenian Genocide 
Resolutions because of the strength of the Turkey-Israeli relations.”227 This would prove 
pivotal in Turkish diplomatic efforts to stop Congress from formally recognizing the 
Armenian  Genocide.  Abramowitz  concurred,  arguing  crudely  that  the  Turkish 
government believed that “the Jews dominated America politically and Israel was their 
principle concern, so improving the whole Israeli relationship and the whole Turkish-
Israeli  relationship  meant  a  good  relationship  with  American  Jews.”228 A  cultural 
centerpiece  of  this  effort  was  the  commemoration  of  the  600th anniversary  of  the 
expulsion of Jews from Spain, which brought together American, Turkish and Israeli 
Jewry. Second, Turkey and America's relationship with Israel encouraged Israeli leaders 
to pressure European officials to support Turkey in its accession process. According to 
Gönensay,  former  Prime  Minister  Shimon  Peres  “instructed  all  of  his  diplomatic 
services within the EU to help [Turkey] get into the union and do whatever they [could] 
to support [them].”229 Third, Israel's provision of arms and weapon systems to Turkey 
was also used as a bargaining chip of sorts in Turkey's ties with the US.
In contrast to its vastly improved relationship with Israel, Turkey's ties to Iran 
remained largely cool. This partially reflected Turkey's strong ties to the US and Israel. 
Adair  reflected  that  “the  United  States'  principal  concern  there  was  maintaining 
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sanctions on Iran. And that was sometimes difficult...for lots of [America's] allies”230 in 
the  region.  Israel  shared  America's  concerns  about  maintaining  the  economic  and 
diplomatic isolation of Iran; consequently, Turkey was motivated to not expand “Turco-
Iranian economic  cooperation.”231 One such motivation was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline  mentioned  in  the  previous  section.  This  was  one  of  America's  methods  to 
support  alternate  routes  for  economic  and specifically energy-related  development.232 
This was particularly important given the Turkish need to find alternative sources of 
energy due to the Iraqi embargo. Beyond its allies' justifications for not improving ties 
with Iran, Turkey also had its own. According to Türkmen, Iran and its revolutionary 
religious movement were participating in propaganda and covert actions in Turkey at 
the time.233 The secular—and military dominated—governments in the first half of the 
decade were antithetical to such religious politics and consequently did not feel a large 
pressure to improve ties.  Furthermore,  after  the military coup in 1997, “the Turkish 
military did not need lectures as to why it was bad politics and policy to get close to an 
Islamic Republic.  They got it.  And as a practical matter,  [America] did not have to 
spend much time making the case.”234
In direct opposition to the improving ties with Israel and in comparison to the 
cold, but largely civil ties with Iran, Turkey's relationship with Syria deteriorated to the 
brink of war in the 90s. Historically, Turkey “always had problematic histories because 
of water, because of many other things. And it continued like that, it was a chronic, bad 
relations,”235 according  to  Sanberk.  By  the  1990s,  Syria  had  also  become  a  major 
supporter of the PKK, going so far as to host its leader Abdullah Öcalan.236 According to 
Grossman, “the Turks would tell the Syrians, why is this guy living in Damascus? Get 
him out of there.”237 The blatant support for the PKK leader and the allowance of the use 
of Syrian territory as a base of operations for PKK violence reached a tipping point 
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towards the end of the decade. The Turks assembled their armed forces at the border in 
preparation for an invasion in 1998. An invasion was only prevented by the expulsion of 
Öcalan from Syria,  after  which,  Syria pledged to stop harboring PKK militants and 
eventually  signed  the  Adana  security  cooperation  agreement  in  1999.238 Despite  the 
danger that Syria's support for Öcalan had for Turkey, it also provided an opportunity 
for improved trust and ties between Turkey and the US. Initially the US put significant 
pressure on Syria not to protect Abdullah Öcalan; it then pressured Russia, Italy, and 
Greece not to provide Öcalan asylum.239 Besides this semi-public pressure, the US also 
captured Öcalan for the Turks in Kenya, which led to significant goodwill on the part of 
Turkey.240 
Although this support was certainly appreciated by the Turkish state and public 
at large, it nevertheless had little effect in tamping down the distrust and suspicions of 
the US that had become quite common during the 90s. Turkey's ties to these three states 
were largely security-based—a common theme in Turkish relations in any era—and as 
such,  were affected  one way or  another  by Turkey's  presence  in  the  US-led  NATO 
security alliance. As such, Turkey readily and enthusiastically improved relations with 
Israel as both an attempt to secure itself better regionally, and to improve ties with US 
within the international system. This approach proved effective, as demonstrated by the 
significant US effort to satisfy Turkish security concerns regarding Syria and Öcalan, as 
well as its efforts to support other means for Turkey to expand its economic and energy 
based  outreach  within  the  region.  Furthermore,  both  the  US and  Turkey sought  to 
maintain and broaden their security-based alliance within the region by cooperating on 
mutually beneficial policies to these three states.
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7.  TURKEY AND THE EU, A SUDDEN IMPROVEMENT
Although Turkey had been on the path towards accession to the European Union 
(or its predecessor, the European Economic Community) since the Ankara Agreement in 
1963, its  progress had stalled considerably by the 1990s. While it  had been Turkish 
policy for a generation to seek admittance to all European-wide institutional bodies, the 
governments—both military and civilian—lacked any strong desire to join the EU until 
the 90s. According to Sanberk, this sentiment stemmed from Turkish officials having 
never “understood what the EU [meant] and what Turkish membership [meant], and 
what the project of Unification of Europe [meant]...So they had always thought that it 
was  joining  the  European  Council—or  Council  of  Europe—or  OECD,”241 no  one 
understood the “essence of the EU idea.”242 Nevertheless, the 1990s saw the most rapid 
advancement  of  EU-Turkey ties  since  the  infancy  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community,  fundamentally  reshaping  the  extent  of  the  relationship.  Partially,  this 
reflected Özal's understanding of the importance of tying Turkey to the rest of Europe 
institutionally.243 However, the US arguably proved the main instigator and catalyst for 
Turkey's improvement through the accession process. As already delineated, the impetus 
for this assistance was the end of the Cold War and concerns within the US government 
that Turkish fears of being abandoned as the rational for NATO diminished. Besides 
rhetorically playing up the importance of NATO to stem this tide of concern, the US 
issued  its  first  statement  in  vocal  support  of  Turkey's  entrance  into  the  EU.  This 
revolutionary statement stemmed from Abramowitz and Bob Zoellick “trying to find 
ways to show [America’s] support for Turkey’s war effort. [They] were always looking 
for  ways  to  help  Özal  deal  with...a  public  opposed  to  what  he  was  doing.” 244 This 
transformation also reflected Clinton's desire to shift the bilateral alliance to “shared 
values and greater political cooperation.”245 All the same, in acknowledgment of Turkish 
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security  concerns  with  the  ongoing  embargo  of  Iraq  and  PKK  violence,  Assistant 
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in  1995 reasserted the American position that 
Turkey remained “the front line state for U.S. security interests in Europe.”246 
For  American  policymakers  in  the  Clinton  Administration,  Turkey's  potential 
entry into the EU was a net positive for all involved—the Turks, the EU, and the US. 247 
So despite the fact that the Europeans were generally not actively supportive of Turkish 
admittance,  the  US  believed  that  “supporting  Turkish  entry  into  the  EU  would 
encourage changes in Turkey that seemed, to [the US], long-term positives for Turks,”248 
by incentivizing  “more  democracy,  more  pluralism,  [and]  more  tolerance.”249 In  the 
1990s, discussions of Turkey not being European, by either ethno-national or liberal 
democratic value parameters,  gained prominence in Brussels  and amongst many EU 
member states.250 Thus the further development of the Turkey-EU trade relationship was 
used as a tool to paper over these concerns. Additionally, Turkey's development in the 
1990s when civilian leaders gained more control from the military reflected a desire to 
reward and encourage “Turkish democratization and political change.”251 As Turkey's 
domestic politics were often in disarray with myriad different governments throughout 
the 90s—a reflection of this young, democratizing process—persistent US restatement 
of  the  importance  that  the  US “attached to  Turkish  membership  in  the  EU,  was...a 
valuable touchstone for Turkish policy,”252 according to Holmes.
Grossman,  with  the  “fantastic”253 support  of  President  Clinton,  consequently 
reached  out  to  the  Turkish  government  as  Ambassador  to  express  the  full-fledged 
American  commitment  to  aiding  Turkey  in  its  admittance,  the  first  step  being  the 
Customs  Union,  as  long  as  Turkey reformed  itself  internally.  The  Customs  Union, 
which no state had joined without eventually becoming a full EU member, proved to be 
a sufficient incentive.254 The primary concern for the EU at the time were the release of 
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journalists and other political prisoners from jail and the reform of aspects of the Penal 
Code.  These  reforms  were  part  of  the  Matutes  package  of  technical,  political  and 
financial assistance that had started with low expectations in 1990 under the direction of 
the European Commission.255 Consequently, Ambassador Grossman, Undersecretary of 
State  for  Economic  Affairs  Stewart  E.  Eizenstat,  and  other  American  officials 
relentlessly and effectively lobbied EU member state governments and the European 
Commission to allow Turkey to join the Customs Union. The successful deal to do so 
was signed at the end of 1995 and came into effect in 1996. The United States’ support 
for Turkey within the EU in 1996 went beyond the Customs Union and the discussions 
upon Turkish  membership.  It  helped,  through NATO,  to  defuse  substantial  tensions 
between  Turkey  and  Greece  over  the  Kardak/Imia  Island  dispute  that  year.  That 
diplomatic  crisis  could  have  easily  ended  in  a  military  engagement—a  ruinous 
possibility, not considered since the 60s or early 70s with the Cyprus conflict. Such a 
conflict would have weakened the military alliance just as it was being used to usher in 
democratic  change  and  security  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  alongside  the  EU 
outreach.256
Beyond the goals of closer EU-Turkey ties and its eventual admittance, Adair 
provided another rational for the American efforts to improve relations. According to 
him, the shift from general support for a closer EU-Turkey bond to active engagement 
in  encouraging  and  promoting  the  process  came  under  the  direction  of  Richard 
Holbrooke, who was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs at the time. 257 In 
the early 90s, Holbrooke was not only focused on Turkey, but also Cyprus, which had 
been a divided island since the Turkish invasion in 1974. He “made the decision that the 
US should try to become more directly involved in both accession efforts, both [for] 
Turkey and Cyprus.”258 He instructed the requisite  ambassadors to  go to  the various 
European governments and encourage them to consider Cyprus'  accession to the EU 
immediately, instead of waiting for the division of the island to be resolved. Holbrooke's 
“rationale was, number one...if Cyprus could be become a member of the EU, being a 
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part of the EU would influence its perspective, its sense of international security, its 
confidence, and make it easier...to resolve the division.”259 The ambassadors would also 
argue for improvements in Turkey's accession simultaneously. The American argument 
was: 
   “If in the long-term we could get both Turkey and Cyprus into the EU, 
then that  would help to  resolve a lot  of tensions and disagreements  and 
problems that otherwise seemed to be evading resolutions. Because by both 
being members of the EU, they would have more things in common and the 
situation would basically be more conducive to a resolution.”260
Beyond  encouraging  this  EU  policy,  the  US  also  was  a  major  supporter  of  UN 
developments  “to  bring  Cyprus  back  together.”261 Unlike  many  other  indifferent 
politicians,  this  push  for  a  simultaneous  resolution  of  the  Cyprus  issue  and  the 
admission  to  the  EU  of  both  Cyprus  and  Turkey  was  supported  by  Özal  and  his 
successor  as Prime Minister,  Mesut  Yılmaz.  However,  efforts  to  resolve the Cyprus 
problem  fizzled  out  in  the  ensuing  years  as  the  domestic  dysfunction,  inter-party 
squabbles, and economic crisis of 1994 took priority. Gönensay remarked that despite 
efforts to resolve the division of the island, the Greek Cypriot portion was allowed to 
progress in its  accession process—explicitly breaking a promise that  Holbrooke had 
made to him.262 
Despite the lack of progress in resolving the division of Cyprus, the Customs 
Union came into effect in January 1996, boosting Turkey-EU trade significantly and 
improving Turkey's legal regime via the requisite changes in laws and regulations.263 The 
Customs Union deal also included $2.5 billion in aid from the EC to Turkey to help its  
economy  “deal  with  the  implications  of  the  Customs  Union,  assisting  some  7,000 
Turkish businesses which faced competition from cheaper European products due to the 
removal of customs barriers.”264 However, the improvement of relations would be short-
lived, since the Custom Union’s financial aid package was suspended within the year it 
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was  established  due  to  “protracted  human  rights  violations.”265 The  human  rights 
violations reflected the relatively free rein that the NSC had within Turkey (particularly 
in the Southeastern region) to conduct counter-terrorism and insurgency activity against 
the PKK. The independent and unchecked capacity of the military to conduct brutal 
operations  within Turkey without  sufficient  parliamentary oversight  or  press  inquiry 
reflected poorly on its movement towards the liberal democratic and civilian supremacy 
norms  represented  by  the  EU.266 Relations  would  deteriorate  further  during  the 
December 1997 Luxembourg Summit when “Turkey was clearly shunted aside”267 and 
Cyprus  was  embraced  into  the  2004  enlargement  group. Grossman  reflected  that 
statements at the time by the Prime Minister of Luxembourg calling “Turkey a nation of 
torturers”268 certainly made EU-Turkey ties significantly more heated than was necessary 
at  the  time  to  encourage  further  political  and  economic  reforms  within  Turkey. 
Consequently,  Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz froze political  dialogue with the EU in 
1997.
The  American  response  to  the  1997  decision—an  outcome  that  it  had  been 
“pushing and shoving to try to avoid,”269 was a major increase in diplomatic engagement 
with the EU. In the ensuing two years, American diplomats intensified their outreach to 
EU  officials  and  member  state  governments  to  encourage  a  reassessment  of  their 
damaged relationship  with  Turkey.270 Washington worked relentlessly to  salvage  the 
EU-Turkey  relationship  and  put  it  back  on  a  proper  and  positive  trajectory.  Thus, 
American officials, in meetings with their European counterparts, “lectured [them] at 
length…on  the  injudiciousness  of  denying  Turkey  a  chance  to  join  the  EU.”271 
Furthermore,  “Washington argued that excluding Turkey was a strategic mistake that 
risked not just the future direction of Turkey’s foreign policy but also its economic well-
being.”272
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A potential  response to this  effort  was the European Commission's  March 4, 
1998 'European Strategy for Turkey,' which enhanced and expanded the Customs Union 
reforms to other areas.273 Turkey would join these discussions by September of that year. 
In  December  1999  at  the  Helsinki  Summit,  EU-Turkey  relations  would  change 
dramatically for the better, and all the while American diplomats were trying to avoid a 
repeat of what had happened at Luxembourg. According to Grossman, US Ambassador 
to Finland Eric Edelman was “hugely helpful”274 at the Summit, taking an active role in 
negotiations.  The  Helsinki  Summit  confirmed  that  Turkey  was  “a  candidate  State 
destined to join the Union on the basis  of the same criteria  as applied to the other  
candidate States.”275 Grossman commented:
   “[It was a] diplomatic triumph for the Turks, but we were very proud to 
have  supported  that  effort.  And  on  the  day  that  they  met  in  Helsinki, 
President Clinton, himself, was hugely involved. He made a telephone call 
to the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Prime Minister Ecevit, urging him to 
accept the arrangement.”276
Türkmen  concurred,  stating  that  “Helsinki  was  made  possible  by  some  American 
direction and American protests.”277 As a consequence of the Summit's decision, Turkey 
benefited  from  “a  pre-accession  strategy  which  would  stimulate  and  support  its 
reforms,”278 including advanced technical and financial assistance, both of which were 
undoubtedly helpful and appreciated. 
Within  the  theoretical  framework  established  above,  Turkey's  maneuvers 
regarding US-Turkish and EU-Turkish ties at this time stemmed from both a desire to 
soft-balance away from and simultaneously to create stronger ties to the US. While this 
action may seem counter-intuitive, it reflects the American goal to improve the stability 
and  dynamism  of  a  strategic  ally  by  further  enmeshing  Turkey  within  the  newly 
predominant alliance system in the post-Cold War. For the Turks, this move—although 
not a priority for many politicians—allowed Turkey to become closer to a supranational 
body that  at  times  sparred  with  the  US politically.  This  arrangement  could  provide 
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Turkey with a potential 'backstop' of support if it disagreed with US decisions in the 
future but feared opposing them. It also enhanced Turkey's security within the US-led 
NATO architecture and outside of it in the international system.
Overall, Turkey's relations with the EU proved to be one of the major, if not the 
most important, sources of improvements in US-Turkey ties throughout the 90s. The 
repeated and public efforts by American officials to jump-start the accession process on 
Turkey's  behalf  had  an  energizing  effect  on  their  relationship  with  their  Turkish 
counterparts. However, it is not apparent if this salving effect extended to Turkish public 
opinion at large. This is most likely due to the existence of other realms of distrust that  
had  a  far  more  noticeable  impact  on  the  average  Turk's  life  than  EU  ties,  which 
remained arguably more of an elite objective until the turn of the century. Examples of 
such areas  of distrust  included the Iraq War,  its  aftermath,  and the 97 Post-Modern 
Coup.  Nevertheless,  the  improvements  in  government-government  ties  provided  a 
bright moment of cooperation to build on in the future. 
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8.  INTERNAL ADJUSTMENTS
Within purely Turkish domestic politics, there was an undeniable, albeit subtle, 
shift  from a  focus  upon  American  strategic  and  military  engagement,  to  a  broader 
emphasis on liberal values.279 Turkey’s democratization and its slow swing to civilian 
instead  of  military  predominance  became  an  increasing  concentration  for  the  US, 
reflecting  Clinton’s  belief  that  democracy—alongside  economic  development,  both 
within the EU—would be the only thing to ensure Turkey’s internal improvement and 
maintenance  of  the  strategic  alliance.  Beyond  the  gains  that  Turkey would  receive 
personally from its own liberalization, the US saw Turkey's developments as a strong 
example for former Communist countries making the difficult transition to democratic, 
market-based  systems.280 Yet,  while  the  US  undoubtedly  supported  democratic  and 
economic liberalization throughout the decade, its actual policies and decisions were 
often less noble and more pragmatic. Holmes described this practicality well, stating:
   “So there wasn’t much of a sense of a political adventure as far as Turkey 
was  concerned  with  the  United  States.  And  over  all  of  this  was  the 
continued  realization,  as  far  as  the  US was  concerned,  that  the  civilian 
government  didn’t  much  matter.  It  was  the  military  that  pulled  the 
strings.”281 
Armitage agreed, noting that it was not necessary for the US to have as strong ties to 
Turkish  political  leaders,  who  changed  frequently  with  a  whirlwind  of  different 
governments,  because  the  military-military  relationship  was  still  strong.282 Holmes 
elaborated, stating that the US “tended probably to spend more time with [the military] 
on  issues  that  would  not  normally  have  been  considered  military  issues  strictly 
speaking, but rather in the strategic sphere, than would normally have been the case.”283
The importance of the military relationship proved particularly true following 
Özal's  death  in  1993.  President  and  former  Prime  Minister  Özal  had  been  the 
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predominant political force in Turkish politics for a decade, overseeing both the return 
to  civilian-rule  and  the  liberalization  and  opening  up  of  Turkey's  economy.  His 
preeminent position domestically via a strong situation in parliament and his personal 
relationship  with  American  leaders  provided  him  with  the  capacity  to  make  bold 
decisions  throughout  his  tenure.   However,  following  Özal's  death,  internal  Turkish 
politics fell into intermittent disarray, which was matched by its economic instabilities. 
For most of the 1990s up through the Post-Modern Coup of February 28, 1997, the US 
“cut [Turkey] a lot of slack”284 when it came to its internal democratic and humanitarian 
flaws  related  to  America  “always  [having]  one  eye  on  the  importance  of  the 
international  security  relationship.”285 The  US  would  always  say  the  right  thing, 
rhetorically arguing for the importance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, 
but it did not utilize any coercive means during this period to induce such reforms. This 
lack of aggressive support for political liberalization may have partially reflected the 
lack of a strong personal relationship between any of Özal's successors and American 
leadership at the time. Apart from a “sort of infatuation by the United States with a 
Muslim country led by a woman”286 when Tansu Çiller  became Prime Minister,  this 
period lacked the type of Bush-Özal bond of the early 90s. 
As with the political situation, the US-Turkish relationship provided little more 
than vocal support for economic support and reform within Turkey. The US provided 
minimal tangible aid, during and in the aftermath of the Iraq War as addressed earlier.  
The Clinton  Administration's  effort  to  “get  the American  financial  situation  back in 
balance after the years of military expansion in the 80s,”287 was the impetus behind the 
US providing minimal tangible aid to Turkey during and immediately after the Iraq War. 
Nonetheless,  although  direct  American  aid  was  not  forthcoming,  the  US  did  assist 
Turkey economically in this period in two ways. First, America provided support for 
Turkey via  the  IMF,  to  which  the  US was a  major  financial  contributor.  This  IMF 
support proved very important in the 1994 economic crisis, and even more so in the 
2000-2001 public and private banking crises. The US was even able to pressure the IMF 
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to commit to a stand-by agreement with Turkey in 1999 as a precaution, although it  
proved ineffective in stemming the tide of financial panic in the following two years. 
Second, the US introduced the Economic Partnership Commission, as a counterpart to 
the  High  Level  Defense  Group—a  key  bilateral  strategic  body.  The  Commission's 
objective was: 
   “to increase cooperation between the two countries in addressing some of 
these economic difficulties. The commission had the effect of establishing 
direct  ties  between  a  wide  range  of  Turkish  and  American  economic 
officials that either had not existed at all before, or had been sporadic.”288
Even though it  did  not  provide  direct  financial  assistance  and proved ineffective  at 
promoting a new wave of reform within Turkey,  the Commission did help “to give 
Turkish officials across the range of governments, a better understanding of the—not 
just US policy, but the rationale behind US policies.”289
In  comparison  with  the  somewhat  ineffective  American  efforts  to  encourage 
widespread democratic and economic reform, the US demonstrated a marked interest in 
and newfound enthusiasm for conducting outreach to civil  society and the public at 
large. This effort was shown to be particularly true for Ambassadors Abramowitz and 
Grossman—the first ambassadors in the post-Cold War period—who actively engaged 
with students, businesses, and civil society groups to encourage a fresh self-evaluation 
of what democracy, the rule of law, pluralism, and human rights meant to the average 
Turkish citizen.290 Grossman reflected that,  while  the Turks “had to  make their  own 
decisions, [he thought] that it [was] proper for American representatives to talk about 
those kinds of things”291 and actively support the growth of civil society from its relative 
dearth in the 80s and 90s. He also felt that a potential catalyst for this reevaluation of 
societal and governmental norms stemmed from the poor treatment of the ethnically 
Turkish Bulgarians  in  Bulgaria  and the rapid influx of  300,000 such refugees.292 To 
Grossman, this treatment “kind of [started] the conversation in Turkey about, huh, if 
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they are doing that to Turks, maybe we should think in a new way about our relationship 
to the Kurds.”293 
Despite civil society's growth and development, the general public's faith in the 
state came to a perilously low point during the 1990s. The loss of trust had been an 
ongoing, slow-moving process throughout the political and economic dysfunction of the 
1990s. The public's trust suffered a precipitous drop in the second half of the decade 
when there were three political 'earthquakes.' These events were the 1996 Susurluk car 
crash and ensuing scandal, the 1997 Post-Modern Coup, and the devastating 1999 Izmit 
earthquake and consequent disgraceful government response. The Susurluk car crash 
took place November 3, 1996 in a town of the same name within the Balıkesir region of 
Turkey.294 To this day, the actual events of the crash remain highly contested, reflecting 
the scandalous nature of the episode; however, it is certain that the four occupants were: 
Abdullah Çatlı, a former ultra-nationalist militant wanted by police for multiple murders 
and drug trafficking; Huseyin Kocadağ, deputy chief of the Istanbul Police Department; 
beauty queen Gonca Us (Çatlı's girlfriend), who were killed; and Sedat Bucak, an MP 
from the  True  Path  Party,  who survived with  injuries.295 Those  in  the  car  had  been 
meeting  with  Interior  Minister  Mehmet  Ağar,  further  tying  the  event  to  the  highest 
reaches of the government. Additionally, Çatlı was carrying a green passport issued by 
the Interior  Ministry and a  gun license signed by the Minister.296 The crash and the 
nature of the casualties created an uproar in Turkish politics shining a light on the dark 
recesses of governmental corruption and illicit acts while also exposing the existence of 
the  'deep  state,'  which  much  of  the  public  believed  controlled  many  facets  of  the 
government. The crash led to a series of widespread investigations of those involved 
and their associates, but the scandal proved to many Turks that the state could not be 
trusted—a  sobering  conclusion  given  the  highly  centralized  nature  of  the  Turkish 
Republic.
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Contemporaneously with  the  Susurluk  Scandal,  the  Refah  Party was gaining 
more and more popularity domestically.297 While Refah's success partially reflected the 
conservative nature of much of the populace, it also demonstrated the growing distrust 
of the existent parties, the ways in which they were used as the personal fiefs of their 
party leaders, and the growing concerns regarding widespread corruption (as seen in 
Susurluk).298 Many saw the Islamist  Refah Party as purer and with less potential  for 
corruption than other political parties. By June 1996, Refah and its coalition partner, the 
True  Path  Party,  formed  a  government  with  Refah's  Necmettin  Erbakan  as  Prime 
Minister. The religious nature and anti-Western sentiments of the party and Erbakan 
concerned a significant portion of the population (despite Refah's electoral plurality) as 
well as the military.299 The US also expressed significant fears over Erbakan's agenda 
and the direction in which he was turning Turkey geostrategically. So, in contrast to the 
treatment experienced by the previous Prime Ministers and Presidents, US officials did 
not  “cut  [him]  a  lot  of  slack..”300 Holmes  expanded  on  this  sentiment,  stating  that 
“Erbakan had a reputation in Washington as being the Turkish Khomeini, and you know, 
if something had been done to see that he was not successful, it was all for the good.” 301 
That  'something to  be done,'  was  the February 28,  1997 Post-Modern Coup by the 
military. Unlike earlier coups that might entail the dissolution of parliament, the creation 
of a new or altered constitution, and the institution of short-term military-rule, this coup 
involved the Turkish National Security Council issuing the government a memorandum 
forcing Erbakan to admit to an Islamist and unconstitutional agenda and to resign. 302 
Following his resignation, instead of choosing Erbakan's coalition partner, Tansu Çiller, 
to lead the next coalition government, President Demirel chose Motherland Party leader 
Mesut Yılmaz to form a new government.  Soon after the coup the Refah Party was 
banned as unconstitutional and Erbakan barred from politics. This dramatic reversal in 
the fortunes of religious and conservative parties within Turkey and the reemergence of 
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the military's role as a final arbiter bode poorly for Turkey's attempts at domestic reform 
and admission to the EU. 
Despite Holmes’ statement above characterizing America's general distaste of 
Erbakan, the US policy was not to “short-circuit  the political  process” and not “get 
discouraged,”303 before the coup took place. This paralleled Gönensay's remarks that the 
NSC had “no direct contact with the Americans and no direct encouragement...it was 
[the NSC's] initiative.”304 Even so, Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy at the time, remarked that the US stood on the sideline 
during  the  coup  except  for  “Delphic  remarks  for  a  secular,  democratic  Turkey.”305 
Despite  this  political  encouragement,  “many  people  put  their  blame  on  the 
Americans...They thought that the Americans were behind all of these things, which was 
not  the case,”306 according to  Sanberk.  It  certainly added to the widespread distrust, 
rampant  conspiracy  theories,  and  anti-Americanism  within  Turkey  at  the  time. 
Nevertheless,  the 1997 ‘Post-Modern Coup’ proved to be something of  a  stumbling 
block in America’s desire to institutionalize civilian dominance over the military and 
democracy. Holmes, commenting on the “awful lot of understanding for the military” 
that had been given by the US” during the coup, stated that General Çevik Bir was “a 
favorite son of the US.”307
Nevertheless, in an attempt to reassert the importance of the rule of law and 
democratic reform within Turkey, the State Department and White House did negotiate 
a list of seven criteria with Prime Minister Yılmaz, which the US would use to judge 
Turkey on human rights issues.308 This list was shared with the NGO community and 
manufacturers  to  have  groups  besides  the  diplomatic  community apply  pressure  on 
Turkey to democratize. Furthermore, in 1998 when current Prime Minister and former 
Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was in prison, the US Istanbul Consul General 
visited him. This event caused an uproar politically, since it was seen as “interfering in 
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the domestic affairs of the country.”309 Nevertheless, it “conveyed an important message 
to  those who labored for reform in Turkey…[who] looked to Washington for moral 
support and even protection.”310 
Finally, the third major event that shattered the public trust in the state, the Izmit 
Earthquake,  took  place  on  August  17,  1999.  This  earthquake  cost  the  lives  of  an 
estimated 20,000-40,000 people, depending upon the source cited. Beyond the loss of 
life  and  severe  injuries  were  the  extreme  economic  and  physical  damage  causing 
hundreds of thousands to lose their  homes. The state's  response to this  disaster was 
feeble, destroying any semblance of faith in the government that many people had at the 
time.  The  earthquake  did,  however,  have  positive  international  effects.  The  most 
important result was a dramatic improvement in Turkish-Greek relations due to aid that 
was given by Greece at the time. This transformation would radically change Turkish 
and American security concerns for the better; the threat of Turkey and Greece going to 
war receded, dramatically reducing the possibility of a repeat of the 1964 Johnson Letter 
Crisis.  Furthermore,  President  Clinton's  visit  to  Turkey and the impacted regions  in 
1999 proved extremely successful as improving relations on a societal level. According 
to Türkmen, Clinton's actions and the “sympathetic image”311 he projected elicited “the 
greatest welcome, probably, among all American presidents after Eisenhower”312 from 
the  Turkish public  and state.  Türkmen recounted  a  further  example  of  how Clinton 
ameliorated the tense relationship:
   “There was a wonderful, a wonderful cartoon which symbolized this visit. 
Clinton is almost a Turk who sits on the Bosphorus with a friend, and he 
says  to  him—what  we  say  among  ourselves—what  will  happen  to  this 
country, what will be the fate of this country?”313
This improvement in ties, although unable to completely reset US-Turkish ties, was able 
to better relations considerably. The bond was further heightened by the end of the year 
with  the  massively  US-supported  EU  Summit  at  Helsinki  in  which  Turkey  gained 
official candidate status.  
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9.  CONCLUSION
This thesis sought to investigate the changes and continuities in the US-Turkey 
relationship between 1990-1999. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War at the 
beginning of this period, the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar international system 
provided an opportunity to investigate how a strategically-originated alliance such as 
the one that tied Turkey to the US would change and adapt to a novel geostrategic 
environment. To examine this relationship, I posed two arguments. First, regardless of 
the Soviet Union's dissolution, the US and Turkey sought to maintain their strategic ties, 
despite the often one-way nature of their relationship at the occasional expense of 
Turkey. Second, the periodically tumultuous and conspiracy theory-ridden history 
between these two states frequently and negatively influenced Turkish responses to 
American policies both towards Turkey and to the region at large. To confirm these 
hypotheses, I utilized a methodology involving both a review of the present literature 
and personal interviews conducted with former American and Turkish governmental 
officials. Furthermore, my investigation employed a liberal realist theoretical 
framework which combines rationalist thinking with institutional designs to better 
understand the motivations of the various actors studied. 
The evidence  gathered  utilizing  the above-defined methodology  convincingly 
demonstrated that both the US and Turkey valued and sought to maintain their strategic 
bilateral  relationship  throughout  this  decade,  despite  specific  policy  differences  on 
occasion. Even with the end of both the Cold War and the bipolar international system, 
the US had not attained true global hegemony during its unipolar moment. Although the 
US achieved an unparalleled level of economic and military superiority, its need to ally 
with and utilize regional actors to realize its policy goals consequently were unchanged. 
Thus,  the  US saw Turkey as  a  linchpin  in  its  foreign  policy outreach in  numerous 
regions, particularly the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. This 
proved particularly true with the advent of the First Gulf War and its aftermath, where 
US-Turkish  cooperation  proved  key  to  sustaining  the  isolation  of  Saddam's  Iraq. 
America also valued Turkey's active diplomatic, economic, and military role with other 
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states  as  crises  or  constructive  events  developed,  such  as  the  disintegration  of 
Yugoslavia or the potential  to  diversify European energy supply via  the post-Soviet 
States,  respectively.  All  the  while,  the  US  recognized  that  the  loss  of  the  bipolar 
confrontation  provided  Turkey—as  well  as  most  other  states—with  the  capacity  to 
potentially change its strategic orientation. Thus, the US worked hard to support Turkey 
where it could as a way to reassure the Turks of their place within the NATO alliance 
and the US strategic  bilateral  relationship.  This  reassurance proved particularly true 
with  the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  pipeline,  the  capture  of  Öcalan,  and  Turkey's  EU 
accession process. 
Yet, the US approach to Turkish domestic economic and political liberalization 
proved to be somewhat ambivalent. Although the US remained rhetorically committed 
to wholehearted liberalization, its policies towards Turkey often reflected its paramount 
placement of strategic concerns over ethics or values. This was portrayed most clearly 
with the rise  of  the Refah government  and the Post-Modern coup of  1997.  Beyond 
specific US foreign policies,  such as the Iraq War, the maintenance of the sanctions 
regime  on  Iran,  and  the  desire  to  improve  US-Turkish  ties,  America's  strategic 
orientation  demonstrated  its  aspiration  to  strengthen  and  develop  a  rules-based, 
institutionalized international system. Despite the ample potential for the US to pursue a 
revisionist and unilateral policy during its unipolar moment in the 1990s, it sought to 
bolster and institutionalize the liberal, market based system that it had cultivated within 
its sphere of influence throughout the Cold War. 
For Turkey, a strong bilateral relationship with the US undoubtedly remained the 
cornerstone of its strategic considerations. Although no longer facing existential fears of 
attack by the USSR, its neighborhood contained numerous hot and cold conflicts both 
independent from and directly related to Turkey. Thus, the Turks sought a guarantee that 
the US remained committed to its territorial integrity. The two most important actions 
that Turkey took to assure itself of America's security commitment were its support for 
the  First  Gulf  War  and  its  increasingly  close  ties  to  Israel.  Özal's  decision  to 
wholeheartedly support Bush Sr. in the war, as well as his initial galvanizing of support 
for the no-fly zone over Northern Iraq established a source of institutional momentum 
that  would prove unshakable until  the beginnings  of  the Second Gulf  War in  2003, 
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despite repeated opposition internally. This backing of the American-led actions in Iraq 
were  supported  by  Özal  regardless  of  the  economic  and  security  problems  that  it 
instigated  because  he  wanted  to  demonstrate  clearly  to  the  US  that  Turkey  would 
continue to be a strong and committed ally in the region. The dramatic increase in PKK 
violence in Turkey stemming from the Iraq War was the most significant and costly 
repercussion for Özal and his successors' support for American policies. On the other 
hand, the relationship with Israel, in terms of Turkey's strategic ties to the US, stemmed 
from  a  belief  that  Jewish  Americans  held  the  key  levers  of  power  in  America. 
Consequently, Turkey sought to develop mutually beneficial strategic agreements with 
Israel  to  garner  Congressional  support  for  Turkey,  particularly  in  opposition  to  the 
Greek and other ethnic lobbies supporting policies that the Turks considered damaging 
to their interests in Congress.  
In contrast to the costly support for the Iraq War, Turkey's close cooperation with 
the US proved beneficial with its relationships in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, 
and  even  Syria.  During  the  war  in  Bosnia,  Turkey  bolstered  its  credibility  as  a 
diplomatic and military actor beyond its direct neighbors, all the while strengthening the 
NATO alliance's credibility following the loss of its  raison d'être. Similarly, Turkey's 
early and active advocation for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline convinced American 
officials to commit to the diversification of energy supplies to Europe beyond Russia. 
This helped to somewhat reduce the initial potential by Russia to bully European states 
through its control over oil and gas logistics. Furthermore, it was only due to American 
involvement and pressure that Öcalan was expelled from Syria and brought to justice 
within Turkey, a major point of pride in the relationship. Finally, the US proved to be 
the  main  initiator  and  supporter  of  Turkey's  rapid  improvement  with  regards  to  its 
accession to the EU. By constantly advocating on Turkey's behalf to the Europeans, the 
US helped Turkey to achieve two milestones in the EU accession process, the Customs 
Union and candidate country status, despite numerous, significant hurdles and crises 
that threatened to derail EU-Turkish ties. 
Although the first hypothesis in this thesis was substantiated by the evidence 
provided, the second was found to be less clear. While determining potential foreign and 
domestic policies, many actors in Turkey, as well as significant portions of the Turkish 
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public at large, frequently cited the tumultuous and conspiracy-laden history of the US-
Turkish relationship. However, the evidence does not substantiate whether this regular 
reference to the shared troubled past was a key, or even significant, motivator of many 
policy  decisions. Nevertheless,  statements  by  former  Turkish  officials  do  indicate 
certain areas where the turbulent history with the US was introduced as a cause for 
concern in relation to America's trustworthiness or commitment to Turkey. The first and 
most pertinent instance was the Iraq War and its aftermath.  Conspiracy theories and 
rampant anti-Americanism by opposition politicians, members of the military, and the 
Turkish  public  reflected  the  widespread  belief  that  the  US  may  have  had  ulterior 
motives  with  regard  to  the  war  and  the  subsequent  no-fly  zone.  Beyond  the  more 
extreme  view  that  the  US  actively  sought  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey  and  the 
creation of a greater Kurdistan, there remained significant concern that the US sought to 
use the PKK and its support for the Iraqi Kurds as a tool to ensure the cooperation of the 
Turks in American policies. Although these considerable fears did not produce policies 
antithetical  to  US  goals,  this  success  at  cooperation  stemmed  more  from  the 
wholehearted support of Özal and his paramount position in Turkish politics at the time 
than from any broad-based decision to assist the US.
The second major instance related to Cyprus. Historically, the conflict in Cyprus 
had resulted  in  an  important  point  of  contention  between the  US and Turkey.  This 
stemmed from the 1964 Johnson letter threatening not to protect Turkey from Soviet 
attack if  Turkey were to  invade Cyprus  and the 1974 Arms Embargo following the 
Turkish military's  invasion of Cyprus to protect the ethnic Turkish population there. 
Beyond losing faith  in  the  trustworthiness  of  the  US significantly when it  came to 
Cyprus, these events also brought to Turkish politicians' attention the importance of the 
ethnic—and particularly Greek—lobbies in Congress. Consequently, as a result of this 
troubled  history,  Turkey sought  out  strong ties  with  Israel  as  well  as  the  American 
Jewish  community  to  act  as  a  counterbalance  within  Congress  against  the  ethnic 
lobbies. Although there were certainly other reasons for the strengthening of ties with 
Israel—many of which were mentioned above—this example does provide at least one 
instance where the tumultuous US-Turkish history had a nontrivial effect on Turkish 
policy.  
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Beyond substantiating the first hypothesis and providing somewhat equivocal 
support for the second, this thesis establishes an effective analysis of how both a pole 
and a medium-sized ally in a troubled region could respond to the shift from a bipolar to 
unipolar  international  system.  This  framework  may  prove  beneficial  for  future 
researchers of US-Turkish relations beyond the 1990s. A further analysis of how the 
US-Turkish relationship evolved during the Second Gulf War and the rise in Turkey of 
the Justice and Development Party's one-party government in the next decade could test 
the strength and resilience of  this  analysis.  Furthermore,  this  framework may prove 
useful in anticipating how the bilateral alliance will evolve in the coming years as US-
Turkish ties are strained to an ever greater degree with the ongoing political corruption 
scandals and upcoming elections within Turkey, as well as the continuing Syrian Civil 
War across the border. In addition to investigating this specific bond, the framework 
could also prove useful in analyzing how relations developed or dissipated between the 
US and other small and medium-sized allies following the end of the Cold War. Such a 
study may surmise that  the US-Turkish relationship was a  special  example with no 
direct parallel, or it could be just one instance of a larger archetype. Regardless, the 
immediate  post-Cold  War  period  and  America's  ties  to  Turkey  provide  ample 
opportunities  to  examine  how  strategic  alliances  may  shift,  adapt  or  disperse  as  a 
geostrategic context changes. 
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